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The relationship between civil society organisations and donors in South Africa is 
dynamic, and takes different forms over time. This is attributed to a number of 
factors, including political landscape, domestic government policies and donor 
policies. These factors then affect the manner in which donors relate to civil society 
organisations and disburse development project funds. 
Prior to 1994 civil society organisations enjoyed abundant financial support from 
foreign donors, mainly due to the illegitimacy of the apartheid government policies 
and humanitarian crisis. This situation changed after the election of democratic 
government in 1994, as most of the donor funds were channelled through the 
government to support its policies and programmes, and partly because of bilateral 
agreements with some of the developed countries across the world. 
In this study the impact of donor policies, processes, and management systems on the 
work of civil society organisations was explored, using the United Sates Agency for 
International Development (USAID) South Africa, Nelson Mandela Children's Fund 
(NMCF) and Sibambisene partnership. Themes explored included policies, processes, 
management systems and tools, partnership and power relations. 
The research methodology used included semi-structured interviews, documentary 
analysis, emailed questionnaires and telephone discussions. Theories on power, policy 
management frameworks, and partnership were reviewed, drawing on, for example, 
the views from the views of Lukes (1974), Parsons (1995), Brinkerhof & Cosby 
(2002), Howell & Pearce (2002) and Nchabeng (2001). 
The results of the study highlighted a number of issues. Firstly that there is unequal 
power within the partnership relationship and donor agencies, and this is mainly 
caused by the fact that donors control policies, management processes and systems, as 
well as the disbursement of project funds. Secondly, civil society organisations, 
particularly NGOs, are dependant on their donors, and as a result prioritise their 
programmes at the expense of communities they serve. Thirdly, both parties value and 
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contribute complementary services towards the achievement of partnership goals. The 
study also revealed that donors embrace principles of equal partnership, participation, 
flexibility and mutuality; but in practice this was found to be wanting. 
Thus donors are challenged to practice these principles, and NGOs to seek other 
strategies that would ensure their independence. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Prior to 1994, most donor funding to non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in 
South Africa was based primarily on solidarity with, and support of, community 
struggles and the broader social movements against the state. As such, funding went 
to a wide range of NGOs, including political, service delivery, research and education 
orientated organisations. Since 1994, however, with the goal of political liberation 
having been achieved in the country, the previous shortcut approach on donor support 
to NGOs was replaced by more strategic interventions around specific objectives. 
Thus, additional strain on the organisational capacity of NGOs has come from new 
demands placed on them by international donors. Before 1994, the nature of the anti-
apartheid struggle meant that many donors adopted a less than stringent attitude 
towards the way in which their beneficiaries accounted for and spent the monies they 
received. After 1994, however, the "struggle-accounting" approach was replaced by a 
much tighter stance on the part of donors towards financial accounting and program 
reporting requirements for NGOs (Kihato, 2001:6). 
During the apartheid era South African civil society enjoyed a remarkable degree of 
freedom and independence from donors, who imposed minimal controls on what, and 
how funding should be used by recipients. One of the main reasons for this was the 
understanding that NGOs under the apartheid government simply did not have the 
technical and organisational capacity to meet the demands of donors. However, after 
1994 donors became more strategic in their funding approaches, and as a result had 
more influence on how the South African NGOs should use the development funding 
they received. Subsequent to this strategic approach to fund disbursement, donors 
designed policies, administrative processes and management tools to be used in 
managing the work of implementing partner organisations (ID21, 2000). 
In this study, "policies" mean predetermined courses of action to achieve desired 
goals, including rules, principles and values that guide behaviour of the organisation 
to arrive at the desired end. The term "processes" refers to a series of step-by-step 
actions and behaviours that organisations follow in managing programme 
development and implementation. Such processes include strategic planning, 
programme development, request for proposals, contract management, and reporting. 
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"Management systems and tools" mean methods and systems that are used by donor 
agencies and recipient organisations to implement and monitor projects and use of 
resources. These include project assessment, monitoring and evaluation, financial 
management, performance management, and information management systems. 
Howell and Pearce (2001) state that the foreign policy objectives of the United States 
(US) government international development aid, as well as the domestic financial 
imperatives, have prompted United States Aid for International Development 
(USAID) to review its funding policies and come up with a new strategy that seeks to 
promote developing democracies. As a result, there is an increasing trend among 
donors to channel their development funding through civil society organisations, 
based on the assumption that strengthening these organisations would lead to the 
achievement of strong and effective democracies. To this end, in 1994 USAID 
established a new Centre for Democracy and Governance as an institutional 
mechanism to implement its New Development Partnership Programme. Currently, 
USAID has decentralised its operations by opening offices in the countries where they 
work, so as to closely monitor the implementing partner organisations they fund 
(USAID, 2005a) 
Critical to this arrangement is the extent to which USAID International policies are 
adapted to the country specific needs and capacities of civil society organisations. In 
other words, to what extent are USAID's development funding conditions relevant to 
civil society organisations in South Africa? Do USAID funding conditions empower 
or constrain civil society in South Africa to do their work? This study investigated this 
issue, looking specifically at how the United States Agency for International 
Development South Africa (USAID SA) policies, processes and management tools 
impact on the work of the Nelson Mandela Children's Fund (NMCF) 
as a donor recipient and Sibambisene1 as a sub-grantee. 
The findings revealed that donors have well developed policies, systems and 
management tools than their recipient partners. These policies and systems are 
developed by donors and imposed to recipient organisations as criteria for funding. 
1 Sibambisene is a Zulu word meaning "partnership" or "together". 
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CHAPTER1: POLICY CONTEXT 
NGOs largely rely on funding from individual donors, foundations, corporations and 
governments. Critics charge that funding sources can seriously affect NGO policy, 
making these organizations implementation potentially the extensions of donor 
agencies, and promoters of their interests. Such charges challenge NGO legitimacy 
especially when funds come from rich foreign governments, corporations and 
foundations (Global Policy Forum, 2003). 
Roy (2004) argues that many Northern NGOs receive a large amount of funding from 
their own governments, and are thus inclined to support those government's foreign 
policies in the operating countries. He further argues that financial support from 
Western governments, multinational corporations and multilateral institutions makes 
NGOs accountable to their flinders, not the people they serve. 
Farouk (2002) quotes Haddad in arguing that the NGOs have lost their cutting edge to 
advocate for public policy change, in pursuit of limited international donor funds. He 
argues that governments and NGOs from developed states view social problems in 
developing countries as charity issues, and then engage with local NGOs in a 
clientilistic rather than partnership relationship. He advocates for fund-raising 
strategies that would ensure sustainability of local NGO resources, and reduce their 
detrimental dependence on international donors and subjectivity to their agendas. It is 
only then, Haddad argues, that local NGOs can claim their public policy advocacy 
space in pursuit of development agendas, free from donor agency manipulation. 
Farouk (2002) argues that in South Africa there is still a strong culture of entitlement 
in the NGO sector and perceptible dependence on the international donor community. 
This has been exacerbated by the fact that most donor funds are directed to the 
recipient States, which then regulate distribution to local NGOs, based on their policy 
and programme priorities. 
Pratt (1998) argues that definitions of civil society are important not for academic 
theoretical reasons, but because definitions used often determine donor policies and 
approaches to fund civil society organizations. Pratt (1998) quotes Howell and Pearce 
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in arguing that different societies, based on their experiences, have their own 
theoretical conceptions of civil society. This then largely influences the manner in 
which states and donor agencies engage with civil society. 
Pratt (1998) cites Howell and Pearce in arguing that US donor thinking on civil 
society has been largely influenced by Putnam's argument regarding the relationship 
between civil society and democracy. This argument maintains that civil society 
organizations play a critical role in strengthening developing democracies. Stoddard 
(2003) argues that the US vision and interest in civil society organizations across the 
world is centered around making stable and effective democracies. Their view of civil 
society is that it is a tool to maintain or strengthen democratic system, in a manner 
that is complementary to the state. 
This study explored the impact of donor policies, processes and management systems 
and tools on the work of civil society, with special reference to the case study of the 
USAID SA, NMCF and Sibambisene partnership. The NMCF receives funds from 
USAID SA to implement their HIV/AIDS programme. The NMCF then sub-contracts 
local NGOs to implement this project. Therefore, a hierarchical chain of partnership is 
revealed, with Sibambisene accounting to NMCF and NMCF then to USAID SA. 
Based in the Mkhanyakude Municipal District in KwaZulu-Natal, Sibambisene 
(meaning together) is a consortium of community-based organisations. The 
organisation was established in 2001 out of multi-stakeholder consultation process, in 
order to address poverty and HIV/AIDS in the District. The organisation was 
established out of concern that there were no vibrant NGOs in the area to respond to 
the socio-economic challenges facing that community. A number of small 
community-based organisations that existed in the area lacked both technical and 
financial capacity to respond to this challenge. Its architects believed that 
Sibambisene would serve as a conduit for funding, provide leadership in the NGO 
sector, and support small CBOs in implementing their projects (Sibambisene Strategic 
document, 2004:8). 
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The partnership between Sibambisene and NMCF started in 2003, when the latter, in 
partnership with USAID, intended to pilot a comprehensive HIV/AIDS programme in 
the Mkhanyakude District. With its multi-sectoral strategy to HIV/AIDS and network 
capacity, Sibambisene was found suitable for the implementation of strategic 
objectives for NMCF and USAID SA, and was subsequently granted funding. 
The NMCF is a national development and grant-making organisation that works in 
partnership with national and local non-governmental (NGOs) and community based 
organisations (CBOs) providing services to children and youth. Established in 1995 to 
address issues facing children and youth in South Africa, NMCF initially functioned 
as a grant-making organisation, promoting a humanitarian response to the plight of 
South Africa's children and youth (Nelson Mandela Children's Fund, 2000:11). This 
period was characterised by ad-hoc funding to meet immediate needs. The 
organisation played a meagre role in engaging with implementing organisations and 
other strategic partners. 
In 1999, the NMCF undertook a strategic review, which led to a policy shift from 
pure grant-making towards a developmental approach to programming. Among other 
things, this meant a meaningful engagement with implementing organisations and 
other stakeholders. In 2000 the NMCF produced the Sakha Ikusasa strategic 
document, reflecting the new thinking and change in the organisational and 
programmatic approach (Kuljian, 2004:4). 
According to the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) for NMCF, the current 2005-2010 
strategy repositions NMCF as the funding and advocacy cum development agency. 
The organisational strategy is characterised by proactive funding, focussed 
programme objective and partner selection, and sustainable project impacts. The 
strategy shifts from seeing beneficiaries of services as passive recipients, to a 
developmental model that perceives people's participation in development as central 
to programmes that will achieve development goals (Nelson Mandela Children's 
Fund: 2005a). Another major shift in the new strategy is the move from one year 
towards a multi-year project funding (three years). This is based on the recognition 
that development impact cannot be measured over a short period, such as one year. 
The new funding approach also gives enough opportunity for planning, implementing 
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and evaluating funded projects (Nelson Mandela Children's Fund; 20056). 
The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) is an independent 
statutory organisation that administers most of the foreign economic development and 
humanitarian assistance programs of the United States Government. It funds 
programmes designed to promote sustainable development, including economic 
growth; agriculture and trade; global health; democracy, conflict, and humanitarian 
aid (USAID, 2003). The purpose of these programs is to contribute towards 
strengthening of sustainable social and economic development across the world, in 
order enhance good governance, freedom, peace and stability. USAID consists of a 
central headquarters staff in the United States and several overseas missions and 
offices (USAID, 2001). 
USAID provides assistance to both non-U.S. governmental and non-governmental 
organisations, through programmes that are managed by missions and offices outside 
of the U.S. Recipient regions include Sub Saharan Africa, Asia, Latin America, the 
Caribbean, Europe and Eurasia. With headquarters in Washington, D.C., USAID's 
strength is its field offices in many regions of the world. The agency works in 100 
developing countries and in close partnership with private voluntary organizations, 
indigenous groups, universities, American businesses, international organizations, 
other governments, trade and professional associations, faith-based organizations, and 
other U.S. government agencies (USAID, 2006). 
The analysis of civil society in South Africa, like many development actors, is often 
situated within either the pre or post 1994 eras. Civil society organisations played 
different roles during these two eras, based on the political and socio-economic 
environment that characterised each period. Donors also had different motivations for 
funding NGOs during each of the two eras, and had different messages regarding how 
those funds were managed. The role of NGOs before 1994 was primarily political. 
NGOs served as vital structures for organising people around the struggle against 
apartheid. The function of many NGOs was to serve as conduits for foreign funding to 
support banned political movements, and provide development services to 
communities that were neglected by the apartheid government. The overtly political 
role of NGOs has become less relevant in the post apartheid era. 
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Kihato (2001) argues that the nature of civil society-donor relations in pre 1994 South 
Africa was largely shaped by the apartheid government's hostility towards anti-
apartheid organisations. Many donors, sympathetic to the political struggle, 
channelled funding to civil society organisations that claimed to support marginalized 
groups and promote democracy. Partly as a result of this hostile environment, the 
administration and expenditure of funds was not strictly controlled. Due to the secrecy 
of donor funds, many funding recipient organisations were not required to keep 
books, undergo independent audits or report back to donors. 
Kihato also argues that after 1994 there was a shift of donor assistance away from 
civil society organisations towards bilateral agreements with the new democratic and 
legitimate governments (Kihato, 2001). During this period, civil society organisations 
were left with the challenge of redefining their role and adapting to the new turbulent 
and competitive funding environment. Many of civil society organisations could not 
cope with the transition challenges and faded away. The current situation is that a new 
generation of locally based NGOs and CBOs that mainly provide services to poor 
communities has emerged. 
The characteristics of these organisations include their lack of technical, financial, and 
material capacity. As a result, they are more dependent on donors for their survival. 
Given this new trend of CSO and donor environment, it is necessary to understand 
how donor assistance programmes would strengthen the capacities on the weak NGO 
sector. The purpose of this study was to explore the impact of donor policies, 
processes and systems on the work of civil society, using USAID SA, NMCF and 
Sibambisene as a case study. 
Based on previous studies on the impact of donor conditions for funding, there seems 
to be evidence that donor policies, processes and management tools have a major 
influence on the work of NGOs. Research done by the United Kingdom based 
International NGO, Training and Research Centre (INTRAC) on the impact of criteria 
for direct funding to NGOs in Bangladesh, Peru and Kenya revealed that donor 
funding negatively affects the shape of NGOs in the South. The study also revealed 
that the inflexibilities and complexities of donor policies, processes and management 
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tools conflicts with the needs and realities of project implementing partners based in 
rural poor communities. 
Another study was conducted jointly by the Institute of Development Studies 
(University of Sussex, UK), Centre for Basic Research (Uganda) and Centre for 
Policy Studies (South Africa). The study focussed on the approaches and impact of 
donor interventions on African civil society organisations. This study revealed that 
most African civil society organisations lack capacity to generate internal (local) 
resources, and thus heavily depend on foreign funding (Robinson, Bazaara, Friedman 
and Gyimah-Boadi, 2001). 
In a study conducted by Smith and Bornstein (2001) on programmes and partnership 
of the Northern Non-government Organisations (NNGOs)2 in South Africa, it was 
found that NNGOs (donors) use management techniques, such as logical framework 
analysis (LFA), strategic planning, monitoring and evaluation (M&E) in managing 
their programmes. These tools in turn become conditions for approval and 
disbursement of development funds, and implementing partners are expected to use 
them in managing their projects. The study also revealed that implementing partners 
have limited capacity to use the above mentioned tools, due to their technical nature 
and limited mentoring and support from donors. 
Sahley (1991:13) offers a similar view when she argues that sound management 
systems, procedures, processes and tools are necessary for effective functioning of 
organisations. However, she argues, most of the time NGOs do not usually prioritise 
organisational development issues like these. Instead, they put more emphasis on 
programming, operational issues, and achievement of results (Sahley, 1991). 
Sahley (1991:15) further offer a framework of organisational management systems 
and tools, which includes the following components: 
Northern Non-government Organisations NNGOs refers to the NGOs from the developed countries (North) that 
work in developing countries (South). They receive funds from their governments, individuals and private sector, 
and fund local NGOs to implement development in developing countries (Smith and Bornstein, 2001). 
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i) Planning: These are methods and systems that organisations use to plan 
their programmes, including strategic planning, project assessment tools, 
and request for proposal methods and processes. 
ii) Financial management: These are procedures and systems used by 
organisations to plan, monitor and evaluate use of financial resources in 
the organisations, including budgeting, financial procedure manuals, grant 
disbursement procedures, financial reporting formats, procurement 
policies, and financial auditing. 
iii) Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E): these are systems and tools for 
gathering, synthesising and analysing project data. Monitoring is done on 
regular basis in order to know if projects are implemented according to the 
plan. Evaluations are done on periodic intervals to check if project 
outcomes have been achieved (Family Health International, 2004). 
iv) Knowledge Management Systems: These are systems used by organisations 
to collect and document project information, with a view to learn and share 
from the implementation, and to identify best practice for replication. 
v) Performance Management Systems: These are tools used to measure 
organisational performance, including operational plans, performance 
appraisals and reporting. 
vi) Capacity Building/Technical Assistance: These are tools used by 
organisations to strengthen their capacities and the capacities of those they 
partner with, including training, mentoring, coaching, and provision of 
resources. 
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CHAPTER 2: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
2.1. Power Relations 
Power structures and systems are deeply embedded in society, and permeate the 
institutions of state and civil societies. Such structures give legitimacy to the 
dominance of particular parties over others in a partnership relationship, which results 
in power inequalities (Department of International Development Fund, 2005). Power 
is a key element in the process of policy making and implementation. Policy-making 
involves decision-making, which is shaped by the power of those that are involved in 
the decision-making process. Decision-making is a process of interplay between 
various actors, and final selection of alternatives to be implemented. These actors 
possess certain degrees of power, and the alternatives that will prevail are mainly 
determined by the power that is possessed by the actors involved (Colebatch, 2002). 
An analysis of power relations is important in this study in order to understand how 
decisions for partnership between donors and recipients occur, what the sources of 
power are, and how power is exercised. The analysis of power relations will also aid 
in understanding how policies, processes and management tools are developed and 
implemented. Indeed, Parsons argues that "power models view decision-making as 
something which is shaped and determined by the structures of power: class, wealth, 
pressure groups, political arrangements, and technical knowledge or professionals" 
(Parsons, 1995:248). 
The pluralists endorse the Parsonian view of power, as something that is legitimately 
afforded to and exercised by a particular group over other groups in order to serve the 
collective interests. However, they reject the idea of 'variable-sum of power', and 
accept Weber's view of 'constant-sum' of power. The pluralists believe that 
population consists of different individuals and groups who have different interests, 
which cannot always be served homogeneously by the group that is in power. Most of 
the time these interests conflict with each other, leading to a situation of winners and 
losers in decision-making and policy implementation. 
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2.1.1 Lukes' Dimensions of Power 
Lukes (1974) calls the pluralists' view of power the 'one-dimensional view' . He 
further concludes that pluralists are concerned exclusively with the power that is 
displayed through observable conflict in decision-making. They believe that decision-
making is the best way to determine who has more power, and observable conflict is 
the best test for determining which group has more capacity to influence outcomes. 
According to this view power is attributed to those whose ideas prevail in influencing 
decision-making. They ignore the presence of power that prevents some issues from 
reaching decision-making, or delay some issues from entering into the decision-
making list (Kingdon, 1995). 
Lukes (1974) furthers his critique of the pluralists' view of power by offering his 
'two-dimensional view' of power. In this view he specifically analyzes the ideas of 
Badrarch and Baratz (Lukes, 1974), and suggests that Badrarch and Baratz's view of 
power embraces different typologies. The first typology is coercion, in which one 
party wins the compliance of the other through threat of sanctions or deprivation. The 
source of power for the dominating group could be legal, social, or economic. The 
second typology is influence, where compliance is a result of tactful influence rather 
than fear of deprivation. The third typology is authority, one group complies to 
another because of the recognition of the reasonableness and legitimacy of the 
demands of the dominating group. Such demands might be regarded as obligatory 
since they are arrived at through consensus, such as a contract. The fourth typology is 
force and manipulation, where one group complies unwillingly by compulsion to the 
dominant group. Lukes then concludes that the 'two-dimensional view' of power, 
unlike the first, is concerned both with decision and non-decision elements of power, 
as well as overt and covert conflict. 
The pluralist view of power focuses on how power is distributed in the decision-making process. The original 
view of pluralists is that different groups have power in different policy arenas, which prevents power from 
gravitating always to the same group or individuals during the decision-making process. However, their 
revised view acknowledges that power and decision-making is not played on a level playing field, but 
biased in favour of those who are well resourced, and functions to the disadvantage of those who are 
less resourced (Parsons, 1995:253; Taylor, 2003:105). 
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Luke's 'third-dimensional view' of power is a critique of the first two dimensions of 
power. He argues that the 'two dimensional view', even though recognizing power to 
suppress some issues from reaching decisions, is still too behavior focused. In other 
words, it focuses on non-decision behaviors that are purely observable, such as 
grievances. Power is however not only displayed through observable conflict, but can 
also be hidden and not expressed. Conflict may exist even in situations where it is not 
displayed in observable behavior (latent) . Neutrality or 'non-decision' making does 
not always mean consensus, and sometimes people may agree not because they have 
interest in that decision, but because they have no alternative. In such cases conflict of 
interest will exist, and there will be silent or indirect resistance from those whose real 
interest is absent. 
Lukes (1974) provides a wider critical analysis and dimensions of power, and brings 
together different views of power and their critiques. His analysis helps the researcher 
to have a broader view of a power analysis framework. In this study, Lukes' 
framework assists with analyzing and understanding the expression of power, both in 
terms of behavior and non-behavior display. 
2.1.2 "Rule of three" Power Analysis 
Galbraith (1984:17) analyses the anatomy of power with what he calls the "rule of 
three". He identifies three instruments for wielding or enforcing power and three 
sources or characteristics of power. The first instrument is condign power, which wins 
compliance by imposing alternatives to the individuals or groups that are unpleasant, 
painful and contrary to their interests, and cause them to abandon their preferences. 
This power wins submission by threatening appropriately adverse consequences, such 
as public rebuke deprivation of resources. This form of power is similar to Badrarch 
and Baratz's coercion power, whereby groups with less power comply as a result of 
fear of deprivation (Lukes, 1974). 
The second type is compensatory power, which wins compliance by persuasion. The 
party that holds power influences the other by changing their beliefs and attitudes. 
4 Latent conflict refers to a conflict that already exists but not yet manifested or displayed in observable 
behaviour. 
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The holder of power wins submission by offering something of value to the groups 
submitting. In the modern economy compensation power is expressed through 
pecuniary reward-payment of money for the services rendered. In both condign and 
compensatory power, the submitting group or individual is unaware of their 
submission. In the former submission is compelled, and in the latter it is rewarded. 
Galbraith's (1984:18) third instrument for yielding compliance is conditioned power, 
where submission is won by changing beliefs and conviction. Instruments for 
conditioned power include education, persuasion, and ethical obligations. Galbraith 
argues that conditioned power is central to the functioning of the modern economy 
(Galbraith, 1984) 
Galbraith (1984:20) further identifies three sources or traits that separate those who 
wield power from those who submit to it. These are personality, property and 
organization. In the modern society personality is associated with conditioned power-
the leadership ability to negotiate and persuade others to willingly comply to the rules 
of the power holder group. Property is in the form of disposable income, which is 
associated with compensatory power. Galbraith argues that wealth accords an aspect 
of authority and certainty of purpose, which in turn invite conditioned submission. 
From this assumption, it can therefore be argued that wealth purchases submission. 
Galbraith also (1984:21) argues that the organization is the most important source of 
power in modern societies. Organizations have become legitimate instruments of 
exercising power and seeking submission. It is within organizations that policies are 
formulated and implemented, laws are made and mechanisms for compliance 
developed. 
Galbraith's analysis of instruments for yielding power is relevant to this study because 
each organization has certain conditions and expectations which arise in a funding 
partnership relationship. For example, implementing organizations are expected to 
comply with donor policies, procedures, performance standards and timeframes. 
Donor agencies may withhold fund disbursement if implementing partners fail to 
comply to their requirements - an example of Galbraith's condign power. On the other 
hand donor agencies may reward the compliance of implementing partners through 
their disbursement of funds. Also, through their capacity building programmes for 
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implementing partners, donors may condition the implementing partners to uphold 
their policies, processes and strategies. This study thus examined the extent to which 
condign, compensatory and conditioned power instruments are exercised in the 
partnership of USAID SA, NMCF and Sibambisene, and is elaborated upon in the 
analysis. 
2.2 Implementation 
"Successful policy outcomes depend not simply upon designing good policies, but 
upon managing their implementation. Instead of identifying ideal solutions up front 
and top down, policy implementers need to iteratively develop second or third best 
answers that collaborating agencies and stakeholders can agree upon. The best 
technical solution cannot be achieved unless there is cooperation, which means 
making modifications to accommodate the views and needs of the various parties 
involved" (Brinkerhoff and Crosby, 2002:6). 
This statement suggests that ready made policies that are imposed on implementers, 
without consideration for their input and adjustments of such policies to the realities 
on the ground, often fail. This implies that organizations that are involved in the 
implementation of policies or programmes should be given enough chance to 
participate and agree on policy design and implementation strategies. This would 
ensure that there is no tension among organizations who partner to implement policies 
or programmes. 
Brinkerhoff and Crosby (2002) argue that policy implementation is a political, 
technical, complex and interactive process. It demands consensus building, 
participation of key stakeholders, conflict resolution, compromise and adaptation. 
They also argue that no amount of external donor pressure or resources, by 
themselves, can produce sustained policy outcomes. For them, there must be 
individuals or groups who strongly believe that the policy is the best alternative, and 
its implementation is worthwhile, in order for a policy to enjoy longevity. 
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2.2.1 Policy Implementation Frameworks 
Parsons (1995:471) identified six policy implementation frameworks, which will be 
explained in this study: top-down rational control approach, bottom-up models, 
policy action frameworks, managerialist framework, and inter-organizational 
analysis framework. The top-down rational approach emphasizes a good chain of 
command and a capacity to coordinate and control as a means of policy 
implementation. Its proponents argue that effective implementation occurs when goals 
have been clearly defined and understood by actors involved; resources are made 
available for the implementation; the chain of command is capable of assembling and 
controlling resources; and the system is able to communicate effectively and control 
those individuals and organizations involved in the performance of tasks. 
It emphasizes the 'forward mapping' rational planning approach to policy 
implementation, which assumes that planned activities will produce certain outcomes 
if controlled, coordinated and well resourced. This model recognizes that conflict 
during the implementation process is inevitable, but systems of control and 
communication reduce it and bring about compliance (Parsons 1995:469). 
The second framework, bottom-up approach, is an alternative model to the top down 
approach. Lipsky (1980:15) argues that policy is made at the implementation level, 
during the interaction between the implementers (bureaucrats) and clients. Street-level 
bureaucrats are the officials who implement the policies on the ground, and who are 
often not involved in their design. Lipsky (1980:18) argues that by their collective 
actions and the individual's discretion, street level bureaucrats devise mechanisms of 
coping with their work pressures, including rationing of services, control over clients, 
and reducing demands on their services. In short, the advocates of this model argue 
that key actors that determine the success or failure of policy implementation are the 
street level bureaucrats, who interact with clients on day to day basis, rather than 
managers who facilitate the implementation of such policies. 
The third implementation theory is the policy action framework, which views policy 
implementation as an evolutionary process. Parsons (1995:472) states that the policy 
action framework is an action by individuals, which is constrained by the world 
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outside the institutional context within which they act. Policy implementation thus 
goes beyond just the chain of command, and requires an understanding of how 
individuals and organization perceive reality, and how they interact with others in 
order to achieve their goals. It is thus an interactive negotiation process between those 
who seek to put policy into effect and those who control resources. It is an action and 
reaction process in which new ideas emerge, negotiation takes place and adjustments 
are made to policy. 
The fourth model is the managerialist framework which emphasizes the use of private 
sector techniques in policy implementation analysis, such as operational, corporate 
and personnel management. According to this model effective policy implementation 
would be achieved with the use of the project planning and management techniques, 
such as the critical path model (CPM) and project evaluation and review technique 
(PERT). It also emphasizes the systems analysis approach, looking at how the total 
sequence of activities, inputs, outputs, and information flow contribute to the success 
or failure of project implementation. The framework stresses the importance of soft 
systems5, cooperation and teamwork as a key determinants of successful 
implementation (Parsons, 1995:474). 
Another element of the managerialist framework is corporate management, which 
analyses the organization's internal (structure, culture, skills) and external 
environment (political, economic, social, legal and technological). An implementation 
strategy is developed according to the capacity and culture of the organization in 
relation to its external environment. The key analysis technique to determine this 
organizational capacity is the SWOT6 analysis, through which strengths, weaknesses, 
opportunities, and threats of the organization are identified. The importance of 
personnel management as a tool for successful implementation is also emphasized. 
Good strategies do not automatically result in effective policy implementation. The 
values and skills of people who implement projects is key to the success of such 
projects. 
5 Soft systems refers to computer based information and communication processes, tools and systems. 
6 SWOT analysis refers to the identification of the organisation's Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities 
and Threats. 
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The sixth implementation framework is the inter-organizational analysis model, 
which stresses the importance of interaction among organizations. The model stresses 
the network of organizations and their behavior during the process of implementation 
as the key determinant of success or failure of projects. The inter-organizational 
model proposes two analytical approaches to policy implementation. The first one is 
power and resource dependency, which argues that the interaction of organizations is 
the product of a power relationship in which organizations can induce other less 
powerful and more dependant organizations to interact with them (Parsons, 
1995:482). 
This models also reflects Galbraith's concept of compensatory power. In this 
relationship the organization that owns resources controls the one that does not 
possess such resources. This leads to a dominance and dependency situation. 
However, the dependant organization may also use some form of power (such as 
community legitimacy) to protect its identity and autonomy from resource supplier. 
This also reflects the pluralist view that groups and individuals possess various forms 
of power, which they use to counterbalance power in the decision-making. 
The advocates of organizational exchange theory, argue that organizations work with 
one another in order to exchange benefits (Parsons, 1995:483). Emphasis here is on 
mutual gain between organizations in a relationship. While the implementing 
organization may depend on its donors for funds, donors depend on the organizations 
for project implementation and local contact. 
These models provide a basis for an analysis of how policies, processes and 
management tools of US AID are communicated, understood and used by the Nelson 
Mandela Children's Fund (NMCF) and Sibambisene. 
2.3 Policy Instruments 
The Concise Oxford Dictionary (2002:734) defines an instrument as a tool or 
something used in performing an action. Policy instruments therefore are strategies 
and systems designed to achieve policy outcomes. One of the attributes of policy is its 
instrumentality. The purpose of any policy is to achieve certain objectives. Policy 
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implementers should therefore devise mechanisms through which policy objectives 
would be achieved, including processes, procedures, tools and systems (Colebatch 
2002). In order for policy outcomes to be achieved, it is important that organizations 
involved in the implementation process agree on the policy instruments, and that the 
users of such instruments folly understand and are able to apply them. If this is not the 
case, there is likely to be tension among partnering organizations, and this will thus 
impact negatively on the delivery of services (Cloete and Wissink, 2000:14) 
Based on the assumption that each organization in this case study has its own systems, 
tools and processes, this study explored how these instruments are used to achieve 
collective goals of the three partnering organizations. 
2.4. Partnership 
According to Olive Publications (an organisation specialising in organisational 
development-2000:48) developmental partnership is a process whereby various 
partners assume collective responsibility for bringing about sustainable social change 
through the sharing of resources, skills, knowledge and experience, with a commonly 
held vision and commitment, in a relationship of mutual trust, respect, responsibilities 
and accountabilities. 
Howell and Pearce (2001:1) state that the idea of partnership is premised on the 
notion that different actors (the state, civil society and donor agencies) work towards a 
common goal, and need to complement each other towards that goal. However, the 
assumption that partnering agencies share the common goal of development, and 
interact without conflict is not necessarily true. Partnership is a political game, with 
each agency involved seeking to satisfy its agenda. Foreign donor organisations seek 
to legitimise their community development mission objective to their funders, and 
business organisations seek to market their products (Howell and Pearce 2001:2). This 
study explored the extent to which the three organisations in the case study pursue 
their individual interests while at the same time they have a common development 
goal to achieve. 
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Pratt (1998) argues that underlying the politics of universality, partnership and choice 
are differential power relations, whereby donor agencies, with their financial, human 
and knowledge resources, inevitably dominate interactions with fund recipients (Pratt, 
1998). This in turn raises the paradox that civil society organizations, which are 
supposed to be marked by their feature of independence, end up sacrificing this 
autonomy to varying degrees through their reliance upon donor funding. This 
statement suggests that there is unequal power relationship between donors and 
recipients of donor funds in a partnership, with donor agencies dominating, based on 
their financial and technical skills. The result is the submission, sacrifice of autonomy 
and dependence of donor recipients to their donors. 
Pratt (1998) argues that most NGOs find it difficult to experience a meaningful 
partnership with donor agencies. True partnership, he argues, should be based on 
compatibility of vision and goals of the two parties. However, relationships between 
donors and NGOs are essentially unequal, with the former possessing more power 
than the latter. Donors retain the right to decide who should get funds, how much, 
when to disburse them and when to stop the funding. The exploration of policies, 
processes and management systems in this case study have enabled conclusions on 
power relations between donors and implementing organisations to be drawn. 
Brinkerhoff and Crosby (2002:87) identified various challenges for the establishment 
of partnerships. Firstly, multiple organizations in a partnership, such as government 
departments, donors, and civil society groups have their own broad range of interests 
and agendas. In this situation it is generally difficult to agree on single policy and 
programme objectives. Secondly, partnership is often characterized by different levels 
of power among various actors. The objectives of stronger partners tend to prevail, 
while those of the weaker ones are suppressed. Thirdly, is the tendency of individual 
partner organization's strategies and objectives to shift over time. An example is the 
change of programme focus by international donor agencies, and subsequent shift in 
donor fund disbursement. 
Brinkerhoff and Crosby (2002:88) further list several situational variable conditions 
which influence the nature of partnerships. The first is the type of regime, which 
influences the space available for civil society to engage with the state and donors. A 
20 
democratic political and bureaucratic system offers a more supportive enabling 
environment for civil society partnerships with the state and donors (Diamond, 1994). 
Secondly, is the presence of supportive legal and regulatory framework for 
partnerships. South Africa has made some progress in terms of developing partnership 
legal and regulatory frameworks, including treasury regulations for public private 
partnership (PPP) and non-profit regulatory frameworks. This study explored the 
extent to which USAID SA subscribes and complies with these frameworks in the 
formation of partnerships with civil society. 
Thirdly, is the level of trust, which influences the willingness among partners to 
initiate joint activities and to work together over time. In order for trust to exist, there 
must be transparency, honesty and integrity among organizations in the partnership 
Nchabeleng (2001:3) argues that the most common reason for choosing a partnership 
is out of contractual obligation. Most of the time donors come with pre-determined 
partnership requirements as conditions for fund disbursement. These conditions 
include policies, processes and management systems. She views partnership as a 
system with inputs, processes, outputs and a life cycle. It involves choosing partners, 
inputs, forming partnership, outputs and monitoring & evaluation, as well as closure 
of the partnership. In the formation stage it is important for potential partners to 
clarify their purpose, values and norms; agree on the management systems and 
working relations, use of resources; and have a common understanding of how they 
will maintain their autonomy (Nchabeleng, 2001:4). 
Exploring the idea of partnership provides a framework against which to explore the 
relationship among the three organisations being investigated in this case study. 
Motivations for partnership, processes for its establishment, its management, and the 
power relations among the partnering organizations are some of the themes which 
emerged. 
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2.5 Management Systems and Tools 
In this study, analysis of management systems and tools was done using the 
framework offered by Sahley (1991:12) and the study of Smith and Bornstein 
(2001:8). These management systems and tools were discussed in details in chapter 
one, and they include: planning, financial management, monitoring and evaluation, 
knowledge management systems, performance management systems, capacity 
building and technical assistance. 
The analysis of these systems and tools provided increased understanding of the 
manner in which they are used by partnering organisations, and the impact they have 
in partnership and service delivery. 
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CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY 
Rubin and Babbie (1997:264) distinguish among three main types of research: 
exploratory, descriptive and explanatory. Exploratory research explores a new 
research topic that might need further investigation. Descriptive research describes 
how certain courses of action or behaviours occur in a particular setting or the topic 
investigated. An explanatory study is concerned with the explanation of why research 
subjects behave in a particular way in relation to the topic being investigated. This 
study is both exploratory and explanatory. It is exploratory in the sense that an 
understanding was sought of policies, processes and management tools that govern 
the relationship among the three partner organisations: US AID SA, NMCF and 
Sibambisene. This study was also explanatory in the sense that an explanation is 
sought of why the three organisations in the case study operate the way they do. 
In this study, qualitative research methodology was used. Rubin and Babbie 
(1997:268) define qualitative research methods as those methods that emphasise depth 
of understanding and deeper meanings of human experience, and that are used with 
the aim of generating theoretically richer, albeit more tentative observations. These 
include participant observations, unstructured interviews and historical research. 
Qualitative analysis is a non-numerical examination and interpretation of observations 
for the purposes of discovering the underlying meanings and patterns of relationships. 
This method was utilised in order to analyse and interpret responses given in an 
interview environment and draw on observations. 
3.1. Data Collection Methods 
i) Interviews 
In this study, a semi-structured interview method was used which, as Rossouw 
(2003:278) states, is a set of preconceived questions asked by the researcher. This 
process allows the researcher to follow-up on responses to specific questions and 
issues of interest, and gain clarity when responses are not clear. This type of interview 
requires that the interviewer should be well informed about the issue being 
investigated. He should also allow the participants to express their views, and be 
careful not to direct the interview in order to meet his potentially preconceived view. 
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The disadvantage of the interview is its cost of dealing with a large number of 
participants. Interviews were used to supplement the literature review method, and to 
achieve two aims; firstly, to track changes that might have occurred and not yet 
recorded or updated in the documents of the target organisations, and secondly, to 
gain clarity on issues that were not clear from the reviewed literature. 
ii) Literature Review 
Rubin and Babbie (1997:252) distinguish between two broad types of data collection 
sources i.e. primary and secondary sources. A primary data source is the first hand 
encounter provided by someone present at the occurrence of the event. Examples 
include minutes of meetings, diaries and organisational laws. Secondary data sources 
include information that is analysed or reported on, on the basis of primary sources, 
by someone who was not present during the occurrence of the event. They further 
state that organisations generally document themselves, and therefore suggest an 
examination of official documents, such as charters, policy statements and speeches. 
An assortment of documents were used in this study in order to gather a detailed 
information on policies, processes and management systems of the organisations 
under investigation. Documents reviewed from the subject organisations include 
strategic documents, project management cycle process manuals, annual reports, 
financial reports, and organisational policies. The advantage of a literature review is 
that it provides detailed and in-depth information that would potentially not be 
feasible to gather from interviews. 
3.2. Sample 
Purposive sampling method was used in this study in order to get selective 
respondents and documents that were relevant for the purpose of the study. According 
to Rubin and Babbie (1997:266) "purposive sampling is selecting a sample of 
observations that the researcher believes will yield the most comprehensive 
understanding of the subject of study, based on the researcher's intuitive feel for the 
subject that comes from extended observation and reflection". 
USAID is a large development agency that operates in different parts of the world, 
and has offices in all the countries within which it operates. USAID SA is responsible 
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for USAID operations in South Africa, and has been chosen because the staff has a 
significant understanding of USAID work and NGO partners in South Africa. The 
NMCF and Sibambisene have been selected on the basis of their partnership with 
USAID SA. The other rationale for this selection is the diverse nature and location of 
the three partner organisations. USAID SA is an international donor, NMFC is a 
national organisation and Sibambisene is a local community and rural organisation. 
There is diverse technical capacity among the three organisations, which has bearing 
on their ability to accommodate the USAID policies, processes and management 
tools. 
The following people were interviewed: 
• USAID SA: Programme Manager and Monitoring and Evaluation 
Manager. 
• NMCF staff: Project Manager, Grants Manager, Monitoring and 
Evaluation Specialist. 
• Sibambisene: Project Director, Project Manager and Finance Manager. 
All the selected interviewees were part of the top management team in the three 
organisations. They were selected on the premise that they understood the issues 
being investigated (policies, processes and management tools), and had extensive 
experience on practical issues of project partnerships. The programme and project 
managers provided information on organisational policies, strategic processes and 
management issues, and linkages of these issues across the partnership. The grants 
manager provided useful information on grant making, financial systems, and fund 
disbursement. The monitoring and evaluation managers/ specialists provided insight 
on the data collection, monitoring and evaluation tools, how these tools have been 
communicated to the partners, and how useful they have been. 
3.3. Access 
One of the limitations of this kind of literature review and interview based study is the 
extent to which the researcher can access the required documents. Thus, in this case 
the researcher made a formal request to the three organisations for use of their 
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information and documents. In addition, permission was sought to interview selected 
staff members for the purpose of this research. Being one of the project staff members 
for NMCF, the researcher had the advantage of a working relationship with the three 
organisations. These organisations generally showed enthusiasm about the study, and 
willingness to cooperate. However, concerns were later raised by some members of 
the management with regards to the use of the organisation's information for this 
purpose. To alleviate this fear the researcher provided the management with the 
research proposal, interview questionnaire, and statement of confidentiality from the 
University of Kwa-Zulu Natal. 
3.4. Data Analysis 
Data analysis involves an interpretation of research data, extracting meaning from the 
information. Rubin and Babbie (1997:398) argue that "such an interpretation of data 
is done within the context of predictions, explanations or expectations that originate 
from existing theories." The researcher explains his findings and determines meaning 
by comparing them with the results from previous similar studies. Data analysis 
allows the researcher to draw conclusions from the results of the study. In other 
words, by analysing data, the researcher contributes to the existing body of 
knowledge, by confirming, refuting or bringing new knowledge. 
Rubin and Babbie (1997:400) distinguish between quantitative and qualitative content 
analysis. In the case of the former, manifest qualitative material is transformed into 
quantitative categories. On the other hand, qualitative content analysis maintains a 
strict qualitative focus and does not change qualitative material into quantitative data. 
The limitation of this method of analysis is that it does not allow the researcher to 
probe the deeper meanings of the subject being investigated, as the researcher relies 
on recorded information. In this study qualitative content analysis will be applied to 
the data gathered through the two processes mentioned above - literature review 
(including documents from the three selected organisations, including organisational 
policies, strategic documents, and management tools), and in depth interviews. 
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3.5. Case study approach 
A case study is "an empirical inquiry that: investigates a contemporary phenomenon 
within its real life context; when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are 
not evident, and in which multiple sources of evidence are used" (Rubin and Babbie, 
1997: 402). As a research method, case studies are distinguished by their exclusive 
focus on a particular case and utilisation of full evidence regarding that case. Sources 
of evidence might include existing documents, observations and interviews. The 
rationale for using a case study is the availability of a special case that seems to merit 
intensive investigation. 
Thus, a case study method was used in this study in order to gain focussed and 
detailed information on issues being investigated. This allowed the researcher to gain 
an insight on information of the selected organisations, and draw general conclusions 
about the specific sector that the case being investigated represents. 
3.6. Limitations of the study 
Researcher's subjective bias: During the time of the study the researcher was 
employed by Nelson Mandela Children's Fund. While caution was taken by the 
research to avoid subjectivity, this could have happened unconsciously during the 
design of the questionnaire and its administration to the interviewees. 
Honesty of respondents: Some of the respondents may have not been completely 
honest in answering questions during the interviews. Given the fact that Sibambisene 
receives some of their project funds from the Nelson Mandela Children's Fund, and 
that at the time of conducting interviews the researcher was responsible for managing 
such projects; it is likely that respondents from Sibambisene could have responded so 
as to avoid damaging their relationship with NMCF. It is likely that they might have 
avoided responses that criticizes NMCF, and dwelt on those that portray the 
organization as a good one. 
Access to information: Certain conditions were set out by NMCF when the 
researcher asked for permission to use the organization as one of the subjects for the 
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study. Initially an agreement was reached with the relevant Project Manager to 
proceed with the study on the understanding that this was merely for academic 
purposes, and that the results would also benefit NMCF in terms of understanding 
their relations with their partners. However, concerns were later raised by some of the 
members of the management with regards to the use of the organisational information. 
To alleviate this fear the researcher provided the management with the research 
proposal, interview questionnaire, and statement of confidentiality from UKZN. 
Based on this, permission was granted for the researcher to continue with the research 
as planned. 
The researcher was unable to access one of the intended respondents. The 
questionnaire was thus e-mailed to her. This was followed up with an extensive 
telephone interview, with the purpose of embellishing some of the responses. 
This study was based on a specific case study of partnership, in a particular context 
and content, and generalization of the findings should be done with caution. 
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CHAPTER 4: FINDINGS 
The findings have been organised according to four themes: policies, processes, 
management tools and partnership. These themes are inter-twined, and in order to 
understand their linkage there is a need to do both comparative and cross-theme 
analyses. For example, in order to understand partnership one needs to understand 
policies that influence it, processes involved and systems used in managing it. 
Therefore, in order to effectively do this analysis, the findings are presented in themes 
per organisation. Thus for each organisation there are sections on policies, processes, 
management systems and partnership. 
It is also important to note that the central theme of this research is power relations. 
However, this concept has not been investigated as a separate theme, because it cuts 
across all other four themes mentioned above, and thus the issue of power mainly 
features at the stage of drawing conclusions about the research findings. 
4.1. Sibambisene 
4.1.1. Policies 
According to the Director for Sibambisene, this organisation has no specific written 
policies, except a constitution and a programme strategy. This is mainly because, he 
argued, policies are evolutionary processes which are developed as the organisation 
grows. Sibambisene is a newly established organisation, and will develop policies as 
the need arises. However, the programme strategy does encompass some general 
guidelines for managing the organisation, such as human resources, financial 
management, and asset management. The Director also stated that both the 
constitution and programme strategy have been developed within the broad national, 
provincial and local strategic frameworks and priorities7, in order to ensure its 
legitimacy and relevance to the local development agenda (Interview with the 
Director for Sibambisene, September 2005). In addition to its programme strategic 
7 In this context national, provincial and local strategic frameworks and priorities mean integrated plans for 
addressing social and economic development challenges in local communities. Strategic frameworks include 
Integrated Development Plans, Rural Development Strategy, Local Economic Development Strategy, Provincial 
Growth and Development Strategy. 
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guidelines, Sibambisene does accommodate policies from their donors, if they do not 
contradict theirs. Sibambisene selectively solicit donor funds based on their common 
vision, values, strategic objectives and needs of communities they serve (Interview 
with the Programme Manager for Sibambisene, September 2005). 
4.1.2 Processes 
The Programme Manager for Sibambisene stated that his organisation solicit funds in 
three ways. Firstly, they respond to calls for proposals from donor agencies. If these 
proposals are considered, certain processes are followed based on the specific donor 
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procurement policies . Secondly, Sibambisene proactively develop funding proposals 
for different donors. These may be generic, that is incorporating all programme 
aspects of the organisation, or specific to the needs of particular programmes. Thirdly, 
certain donors become interested in Sibambisene, and approach the organisation to 
develop a funding proposal (Interview with the Programme Manager for Sibambisene, 
September 2005). 
The Director stated that Sibambisene communicates and interacts with NMCF more 
regularly than other donors. This has been made possible by the presence of 
provincially based Project Officers. They are the first contact with NMCF, and are 
easily accessible when the organisation needs them. However, NMCF is inconsistent 
in their communication approaches. The organisation often fails to observe 
communication channels and protocols, especially when under pressure (Interview 
with the Director for Sibambisene, September 2005). 
4.1.3 Management Systems and Tools 
Governance and Management 
Sibambisene is governed by seven management board members and nine staff 
members. Staff members include the Director, Programmes Manager, five Portfolio 
Managers, Finance Administration Officer, and Administration Assistant. The 
management board is essentially responsible for running the organisation. Staff 
8 In this context donor procurement processes refers to procedures and steps that donors follow in 
approving and establishing partnerships with implementing organisations. 
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members are responsible for the administration, facilitation, coordination and 
monitoring of implementation (Interview with the Director for Sibambisene, 
September 2005). 
Planning and monitoring 
Sibambisene have their own management systems such as, planning, monitoring and 
evaluation, reporting, financial, communication, information management, and 
performance management systems (Interview with the Finance Manager for 
Sibambisene, September 2005). In addition, donors including NMCF bring along their 
specific donor management systems and tools, as conditions for use of granted funds 
and implementation of projects. Thus, the organisation ends up using different 
systems and tools in order to meet donor specific requirements. While this system 
ensures that donor requirements are met, it disintegrates the management systems of 
the grantee (Interview with the Programmes manager for Sibambisene, September 
2005). The Programmes Manager also stated that they have never participated in 
strategic planning sessions of the NMCF and USAID, except the Annual General 
Meetings for the NMCF. This implies that participation of donor funding recipients in 
strategic planning and decision making issues is very limited (Interview with the 
Programme Manger for Sibambisene, September 2005). 
The Director stated that Sibambisene holds monthly reporting and planning meetings 
with its affiliates, where reports are presented and planning for the following month is 
done. This is followed by project monitoring visits by project managers, and provision 
of technical support where necessary. It was also stated that in addition to the general 
monitoring and evaluation tools of Sibambisene, the NMCF has brought along 
specific monitoring and evaluation (M&E) tools in order to monitor its projects, as 
required by the USAID (Interview with the Director, September 2005). 
Finance Management 
The Finance Manager stated that Sibambisene has its own finance management 
systems. However, donors including NMCF enforce their own procedures and 
guidelines for managing their funds. For example, based on the USAID SA's 
procurement policies, the NMCF instructed Sibambisene to use USAID SA approved 
auditors when auditing their financial statements. 
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Technical support 
The NMCF provides different levels of technical assistance to Sibambisene. The first 
level is one provided by project officers, in terms of continuous monitoring and 
advice. The second is provided by independent consultants who are often contracted 
to provide specific technical services such as capacity building on project 
management and information management. The third one comprises of capacity 
building organisations who are contracted to provide training on specific technical 
issues to the NMCF implementing partners. These specific technical issues include 
report writing, presentation skills and financial management (Interview with the 
Programme Manager for Sibambisene, September 2005). 
To a certain extent, the NMCF has provided some technical support to Sibambisene, 
especially training on monitoring and evaluation, financial management, psychosocial 
support, and micro finance. However, Sibambisene expressed a concern regarding 
NMCF's approach for technical assistance, stating that it is once-off training, without 
sufficient follow-up and on-site coaching and mentoring. As a result, Sibambisene 
staff find it difficult to apply technical skills learnt from these trainings (Interview 
with Finance Manager for Sibambisene, September 2005). 
4.1.4 Partnership 
In an interview with the Director for Sibambisene (September 2005), he stated that 
Sibambisene believes in partnerships as a mechanism for sharing resources and skills 
in pursuance of common vision. Sibambisene and NMCF formed a partnership 
because they had something "to offer" in order to achieve a common vision. The 
former had vision, human capacity, and legitimacy within the community. The latter 
had the vision, technical capacity, and financial resources. 
The Director also distinguished between two levels of partnership that Sibambisene is 
involved in. One is formal and obligatory-entering into a binding contract with 
specific conditions and timeframes. In this type of partnership the two parties have to 
comply with conditions stated in the contract. Non-compliance might result in serious 
tension, breaking of the contract and withdrawal of funds. This is the type of 
partnership Sibambisene have with donors, including NMCF. The other type of 
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partnership is informal and voluntary. Organisations agree to work together in order 
to achieve a common goal, such as networking with government and private sector 
organisations (Interview with the Director for Sibambisene, September 2005). 
4.2 The Nelson Mandela Children's Fund 
4.2.1 Policies 
The NMCF is guided by both national and international policy frameworks and 
instruments in planning its programmes. These include the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996, The Social Assistance Act No. 13 of 2004, 
The Child Care Act of 1991, The South African Schools Act No.84 of 1996, The Child 
Justice Bill of 2002, and The National Action Plan for Orphans and Children Made 
Vulnerable by HIV/AIDS, South Africa, 2006-2008. Also, the NMCF's approach to 
programming for children is based on the international conventions that South Africa 
has subscribed to, including the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, 
1989; and the African Charter on the Rights of Children, 1990 (Nelson Mandela 
Children's Fund, 2000). 
In addition, the NMCF is guided by its internal policies which are based on national 
policies and legislations, such as the Non Profit Organisations Act 71 of 1997 
(NPOA), Finance Information Centre Act (FICA) 38 of 2001 and the King Report on 
Corporate Governance of 2002. The Board of Trustees has approved internal policies 
to govern NMCF operations, including financial, investment, human resource 
management, and fundraising policies (Nelson Mandela Children's Fund, 2005Z>). 
The Sakha Ikusasa 2005-2010 is the strategic guiding document for all operations of 
the NMCF. This document contains the goals, values, principles, and strategic 
objectives for NMCF. The Sakha Ikusasa 2005-2010 strategy has introduced new 
criteria for partner selection. Each programme for NMCF has specific criteria which 
reflects the organisational values, strategic objectives, governance, administration, 
and management issues. These criteria ensure that there is an alignment between 
NMCF strategy and the implementing partners. They ensure that NMCF selects 
partners that would help the organization to achieve its objectives (Nelson Mandela 
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Children's Fund: 20056). 
Since NMCF receives funds from various donors, some of them such as USAID 
attach their policies as conditions for funding. This means that the NMCF, in addition 
to its policies, has to comply with the policy requirements attached to certain donor 
funds (Communication9 with the NMCF Grants Manager, September 2005). 
4.2.2 Processes 
Previously, the NMCF solicited project implementation partners through newspaper 
adverts. These projects would then undergo procurement processes, including 
proposal assessments by project officers, presentations of assessment reports to the 
Management, and recommendations of selected partners to the Management Board 
for approval, contracting, monitoring and evaluation. However, this method was 
found to have shortcomings, as the organisation could not direct funds to the targeted 
geographic areas. With the advent of the new programme strategy, a new method of 
project solicitation was developed (Nelson Mandela Children's Fund: 2005c). 
9 Communication in this context refers to information received through an informal conversation with 
the respondents. It differs from the interview in that there is no pre - set and structured questions. 
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The diagram below illustrates the process for requesting funds: 
THE RFP CYCLE 
1 . Solicitation-Advert, 










4. Recommendations to the 
NMCF Board of Trustees. 
Approval /Declines & 
lotification 





7. Reflection/RFP Process 
Review 
(Diagram 1: Adopted from the NMCF Request for Proposal Document) 
The first phase involves the request for concept papers through adverts in national and 
local newspapers and radio stations. This process is complemented by public 
meetings, which allow for more face-to-face interaction between NMCF staff and 
interested organisations. These meetings are publicised through national and 
community radios, as well as invitations to individual organisations. The structure of 
these meetings includes an NMCF staff presentation, explaining the organisational 
strategy, programme goals and focus areas. The presentation is followed by a 
discussion with the participants (Nelson Mandela Children's Fund: 2005c). 
The second phase involves short-listing of project proposals, appraisals and selection 
by the Grants Review Committee (GRC). The third phase is the pre-award 
assessments and joint proposal development. NMCF visit the short-listed projects, to 
gather more project information, and develop the proposal jointly with prospective 
organisations. This process allows implementing organisations to participate in the 
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programme design. The fourth phase involves the presentation and recommendation 
of proposals jointly developed with the prospective partners to the NMCF Board of 
Trustees. This is followed by the contracting of approved projects, and monitoring of 
implementation (Nelson Mandela Children's Fund: 2005c). 
4.2.3 Management tools 
Governance and Management 
The NMCF is governed by a Board of Trustees from various professional 
backgrounds. This Board ensures that NMCF upholds the principles of effective 
governance, such as accountability, integrity and openness. The Board has delegated 
the Management Trustees Committee (MTC), to manage decisions on behalf of 
NMCF. The Management Trustees Committee has further established sector specific 
subcommittees, such as finance and auditing, development, investment, human 
resources, and marketing committees. These committees ensure an effective and 
focussed web of good governance (Nelson Mandela Children's Fund, 2004). 
The Management Trustees Committee has delegated the implementation and day-to-
day operations to the NMCF staff, under the leadership of the Chief Executive Officer 
(CEO). However, the MTC is still responsible for all key decisions for the operation 
of the NMCF, including strategic, policy, and financial decisions. This system of 
governance creates a hierarchical structure that ensures a strong sense of 
accountability (NMCF, 2005). According to the CEO, the NMCF staff are competent 
enough to respond to the needs and demands of communities they serve (Nelson 
Mandela Children's Fund: 2005a). 
Planning and Monitoring 
Each year the NMCF undertakes a strategic review exercise to reflect on the progress 
made and challenges encountered during the previous year (NMCF Strategic Review 
Document, 2004). Monitoring and evaluation is a priority and at the centre of 
NMCF's work. This is evident in the organisation's development of Monitoring and 
Evaluation Strategic Framework, time spent by their officers in project monitoring, 
and evaluation studies undertaken in the past. The objective of monitoring and 
evaluation is to ensure regular collection and analysis of information, based on the 
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progress made towards the achievement of defined objectives and goals. It is also to 
ensure continuous learning, identification of best practice, and improvement of 
programmes. 
The NMCF also uses monitoring and evaluation system as a tool to account to their 
Management Board and donors. In order to achieve monitoring and evaluation goals, 
NMCF acknowledges the need for building the capacity of implementing partners. As 
a result, monitoring and evaluation training has been done for all NMCF partners. 
This is followed by continuous support from the monitoring and evaluation specialist 
(Interview with the NMCF Project Manager, September 2005). 
Financial management 
According to the Grants Manager for NMCF, There are three units that deal with 
finances: Grants Management, Resource Mobilisation and Finance Administration. 
The grants unit is responsible for the management of grants, including fund 
disbursement, expenditure control, project finance reporting, compliance monitoring, 
and capacity building for partners on financial systems. The unit provides a support 
function, and works closely with the programmes department. Working in 
collaboration with the project officers, grants unit is NMCF's contact for 
implementing partners (Interview with the NMCF Grants Manager, September 2005). 
The finance administration is responsible for NMCF's internal finance management, 
including finance policies, systems, procedures, and processes. This unit is also 
responsible for the day-to-day finance administration, including accounts payment, 
cash management, and financial reporting. The resource mobilisation unit is 
responsible for donor management, including liaising and maintaining good 
relationship with NMCF donors and affiliates (Nelson Mandela Children's Fund: 
2005</). 
Technical Assistance 
One of the key values for NMCF is institutional development and transformation. In 
its strategy, the NMCF acknowledges that in order to achieve its objectives, there is a 
need for capacity among the implementing organisations to successfully implement 
funded projects. The organisation also acknowledges that implementing partners vary 
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in their capacity levels to achieve programme goals. Therefore, there is a need to 
strengthen the capacity of implementing partners, if NMCF has to succeed in 
implementing its strategy. As a result, capacity building and institutional development 
is a cross cutting theme in the NMCF strategy, providing a mechanism to strengthen 
the internal capacity of implementing partners (Nelson Mandela Children's Fund: 
2005^). 
The NMCF strategy identifies two levels of technical assistance. Firstly, NMCF 
commissions consultants and research institutions to provide necessary capacity 
building services to its partners. The second level of technical assistance is provided 
to the partners by NMCF internal staff. The NMCF strategy highlights the point of 
employing experienced and skilled programme specialists and technical advisors to 
provide ongoing technical support to the implementing partners. These specialists 
include programme, monitoring and evaluation, and knowledge and information 
management (Nelson Mandela Children's Fund: 2005b). 
4.2.4 Partnership 
The NMCF strongly believes that its strategic goals can only be achieved through 
partnership with other organisations, communities, and donors. Emphasis on 
partnership features across the organisation's strategy, programmes and activities. 
Partnership is emphasized in the mission statement, as follows: "to develop 
partnerships and initiate programmes that which empower and improve the wellbeing 
of children and youth; and sustain these initiatives through the development of sound 
financial and knowledge support base" (Nelson Mandela Children's Fund, 2005^:4). 
The concept of partnership is also emphasized in the NMCF strategy as a cross-
cutting theme. The NMCF Sakha Ikusasa Stategic Document identifies institutional 
development as a critical area for the implementation of the strategy. Through this 
objective NMCF seeks to build and strengthen the internal capacity of implementing 
partners to perform service delivery. Partnership is also emphasised in the rationale 
for the Request for Proposal document. NMCF identifies three principal aims of the 
RFP process. Firstly, it is a tool to meet partner objectives, which feed into NMCF 
strategic objectives. Second, it is an efficient grant management system that ensures 
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governments' foreign policies. USAID is an independent federal agency that receives 
overall foreign policy guidance from the U.S. Secretary of State (USAID, 2006:25). 
The U.S. National Security Strategy identifies four complementary programme areas 
for implementing the Strategy. These are defence, diplomacy10, development and 
humanitarian assistance. Both defence and diplomacy programmes are the 
implemented by the U.S. government respectively through its military programmes 
and country-based diplomatic missions (USAID, 2002). The USAID is responsible for 
implementing both the development and humanitarian programmes (USAID, 2005a). 
However, even though each of these four pillar programmes has its own specific 
programmes and objectives to achieve, they all operate in a complementary manner. 
For example, when diplomatic interventions (negotiations) fail in a country, resulting 
in a state of conflict and war, the U.S. government deploys its military force to the 
affected country in order to normalise the situation. During the crisis period, the 
USAID, through its partners in the affected country, provides the humanitarian 
assistance to the destitute citizens. This is evident form the current crisis situation in 
Iraq, where the USAID is engaged in a humanitarian and development activities, 
while the U.S. military carries its defence operations (Stoddard, 2003). 
The USAID policy is aligned to the U.S. government policies and strategies, and 
adapts to the changes of the latter. Quoting the USAID Administrator Andrew 
Natsios, USAID (2006) states that the USAID seeks to use bilateral foreign 
assistance to build a safer and more secure, democratic and prosperous world to 
enhance the U.S. national security; and that the implementation of the USAID policies 
is coordinated with other U.S. government policies and programmes. 
The USAID (2006) further states that the USAID policy and strategy development in 
the USAID is an evolutionary process that changes with the emerging demands of the 
U.S. National Security Strategy, as shaped by the global changes and interests of the 
U.S. government and American people. 
10 Diplomacy is the art and practice of conducting negotiations between nations, and the skill to do so without causing hostility. 
Development refers to long-term and sustainable interventions to social and economic problems of a country, including poverty, 
inequality and HIV/AIDS. Humanitarian assistance refers to the short-term interventions in situations where there is human 
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The USAID has developed a number of policy frameworks including the Foreign Aid 
in the National Interest; U.S. Foreign Aid: Meeting the Challenges of the Twenty-first 
Century (2004); Fragile States (2005); At Freedom's Frontiers: A Democracy and 
Governance Strategic Framework (2005); and the Policy Framework for Bilateral 
Foreign Aid (2006). 
The USAID (2006) also state that the strategic alignment of the USAID policies to 
respond to the U.S. National Strategy positions the organisation to implement the 
foreign policy objectives of President Bush, including the Global War on the Terror 
and the Freedom Agenda (quoted in the USAID Policy Framework for Bilateral 
Foreign Aid, 2006:2). According to the USAID Policy Framework on Bilateral 
Foreign Aid (2006), USAID's policy framework is based on five strategic goals. 
11 19 
These are promoting transformational development ; strengthen fragile states 
support strategic states1 provide human relief; and address global issues . 
The USAID believes that development is critical for reducing risks that could lead to 
"fragile states", and that fragile states have four main characteristics. These are weak 
and collapsing governments, poverty, humanitarian crisis, criminal and terrorism 
networks. The USAID also believe that instability, acts of violence and terrorism 
result from a lack of economic opportunity, poverty, poor social and health 
conditions, and weak democracy (USAID, 20056). 
Thus, in order to reduce risks associated with the above, USAID promotes economic 
growth, health and social wellbeing, and enhances democracy and provision of human 
relief services in crisis situations. These efforts to improve the lives of millions of 
people worldwide represent U.S. values and advance U.S. interests for peace and 
prosperity (USAID, 20055). 
crisis such as war or natural disasters such as floods. It includes provision of resources such as food, shelter, clothing and health 
facilities. 
11 Transformational development refers to the changes in governance and institutions, human capacity, and economic structure, 
for sustainable development without dependence on foreign funding. 
12 
Fragile states refers to governments which are characterised by weak government leadership and capacity, and there is a threat 
of instability and security. 
Strategic states refers to specific countries that are high priority to the U.S. government. 
Global issues here refers to social, economic and natural problems that affect people across the world. 
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USAID SA policies are developed in Washington and cascaded down to the Mission 
Office. Mission Offices then consult with implementing partners, both Government 
Departments and NGOs. However, USAID policies are aligned with policies, 
strategies and programmes of donor recipient governments. USAID development 
funding is granted based on both the USAID programme objectives as well as 
priorities of recipient countries. For example, USAID SA funded the implementation 
of the South African National Integrated HIV/AIDS Strategic Plan 2000-2005 
(Interview with USAID SA Programme Manager, September 2005). 
4.3.2 Management Systems and Tools 
Governance and management 
The USAID Administrator, Andrew Natsios (quoted in the USAID Policy Framework 
for Bilateral Foreign Aid, 2006) states that the primary responsibility for achieving 
the USAID development goals largely rests with the host nations, including their 
leadership and citizens. USAID seeks to play a catalyst role in facilitating the 
development agenda within recipient countries, in order to ensure that leadership and 
ownership remains with country leaders and citizens. Thus, the USAID believes that 
political will and good governance are prerequisites for a successful development 
agenda. Where this is lacking, this is a characteristic of "fragility" and a diagnosis for 
development failure (USAID, 20056). In order to promote good governance in 
developing countries, the U.S. government has enacted a number of laws and forums. 
These include the African Growth and Opportunity Act15 (AGOA) of 2000, Africa 
Investment Incentive Act of 2006, and the Presidential African Global 
Competitiveness Initiative of 2006 (U.S. Department of State, 2006:1). 
The USAID is a hierarchically structured organisation with a Central Office in the 
U.S, Regional Offices (eg Sub-Sahara), and Mission Offices (Country Offices). In 
addition, the central Office has Bureaus (technical support units, such as Policy 
bureau) who are responsible for guiding and supporting Regional and Mission Offices 
on various development issues. At the strategic level, USAID is headed by the 
African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) of 2000 is the mechanism for the U.S. government to encourage trade and 
investment sub-Saharan Africa, with a view to create development opportunity for the African people. These are trade benefits 
for African States that make continuous progress towards a market-based economy, rule of law, free trade, poverty reduction, and 
protection of the workers' rights. 
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Administrator, who accounts to the Secretary of the U.S. State on policy and strategic 
issues. The Secretary of the State then accounts to the U.S. Cabinet and President on 
all policy issues and foreign assistance programmes. At the operational (country) 
level, USAID is headed by the Country Director, who is accountable to the U.S. 
Ambassador. 
Previously, Country Offices were not directly accountable to the U.S. Ambassador, 
but now has been integrated into his office, due to the integration of USAID and U.S. 
government strategic plans (Interview with the USAID Programme Manager, 
September 2005). This is fuelled by the strategic changes and alignment of the 
USAID and U.S. Government policies and strategies, with a view to synergise their 
operations in order to effectively achieve the U.S. National Security goals (USAID, 
2006). 
In addition to the internal governance and management structures, the Advisory 
Committee On Voluntary Aid (ACVFA)16 was established by the Presidential directive 
after the World War II to serve as link between the U.S. Government and the Private 
Voluntary Organisations (USAID ACVFA, undated). 
Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation 
The US Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 requires the U.S. 
Government and all its agencies to produce a strategic plan, an annual performance 
plan, and an annual performance report. In order to fulfil this requirement, the USAID 
has put managing for results17 at the centre of its operations, and as one of its core 
values. To this end, the USAID developed the Results Framework (2001) to serve 
both as a planning and performance management tool. 
The USAID is also required to prepare and submit Performance Accountability 
Reports (annual performance reports) to U.S. President and Congress. The report 
reflects progress on achievement, set objectives for the fiscal year, challenges 
16 The Advisory Committee On Voluntary Aid (ACVFA) consult, provide information and advises the USAID other U.S. 
Government agencies on development issues relating to the foreign aid. They also liase between private organisation, USAID on 
issues of development and foreign aid. 
17 Managing for results means organising work around results sought to be accomplished. 
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encountered and explanation of variances, plans for addressing those challenges, and 
best practice learning from programmes implemented. (USAID, 2002). 
The USAID defines results as 'significant', 'intended', and 'measurable change' in 
the lives of service recipients. The results framework serves three purposes. Firstly, it 
provides a framework for programme managers to measure progress towards 
achievement of result and to make appropriate adjustments. Secondly, it helps 
operating units and implementing partners to reach consensus and ownership around 
objectives and approaches to meet those objectives. Thirdly, it serves as a 
communication tool between operating units implementing partners (USAID, 2002). 
Another management tool for USAID is the U.S. Government Auditing Standards. 
The U.S. Inspector General Act of 1978 set U.S. Government Auditing Standards as 
the mechanism with which all U.S. agencies and implementing partners have to 
comply (USAID Office of Inspector General, 2003). The Office of the Regional 
Inspector General ensures that the recipients of USAID donor funds undertake quality 
audits in line with the U.S. government Auditing Standard. This is done through 
maintaining data of USAID approved audit firms, which are categorized as 
1 8 
"preferred", "regular" and "conditional" . 
The U.S. government and USAID have developed a number of instruments and tools 
to ensure effective performance systems. In 2004 USAID and the US State 
Department produced a joint strategic plan for the financial year 2004 to 2009, in 
order to ensure that diplomatic efforts and development programmes are fully aligned 
to advance the President's National Security Strategy of 1993. In addition to the 
strategic plan, the USAID is required to develop an annual plan and performance 
measurement plan (USAID, 2005c). 
According to the USAID SA Programme Manager, the process for developing plans 
and budgets is hierarchical, starting from the bottom to the top. Firstly, USAID 
18 
Preferred audit firms are those who comply with the U.S. Government Auditing Guidelines. 
Regular firms refers to those audit firms who regularly conduct audits for USAID donor recipients, and whom the Regional 
Inspector General believes can comply with the U.S. Government Auditing Standards. 
Conditional firms are locally based auditing firms which can be used by USAID implementing partners subject to the approval of 
USAID. 
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implementing partners submit their individual plans to USAID Mission Offices, with 
detailed activity plans, measurement plans and budgets. Secondly, the USAID 
Mission Office compiles Country Operational Plans and submits these to the 
Operation Units (program sectors). Operation Units then compile a comprehensive 
USAID plan and submit them to the Bureau Office (Highest USAID Office), which 
then present them to the Congress (Interview with the USAID Program Manager, 
September 2005). 
Charles and McNulty, (1999:1) state that USAID, like other government agencies, is 
required to develop useful and meaningful performance goals and indicators 
consistent with the US government Performance Results Act of 1993 and Foreign 
Assistance Act of 1961. USAID staff and partners are required to develop a 
performance monitoring plan that includes performance indicators and their 
definitions, data source and quality, method of data collection, frequency and 
schedule of data collection, responsibilities for acquiring data, and a data analysis 
plan. 
USAID embraces new evaluation and review models to ensure the use of robust and 
accurate data in USAID's budget and performance planning and reporting. The 
organization believes that programme evaluation is an important tool to determine 
whether USAID programmes have reached set objectives, as well as being tools 
providing objective inputs to policy and planning decisions. As a mechanism for 
tracking the results of its work, USAID identifies two levels of results: strategic 
objective and intermediate results. The former refers to the highest level of result for 
which USAID Operating Units are held accountable. The latter refers to those results 
that USAID funded development partners are held accountable for. Intermediate 
results are essential steps towards the achievement of Strategic Objective. They are 




According to the USAID SA Program Manager, USAID management systems and 
tools are developed centrally from the headquarters of the organisation, by the office 
of the relevant Bureau (technical) unit and cascaded down to the Mission Offices for 
implementation. USAID continuously review and change their management systems 
and tools, with a view to improving them. This results in the constant changes and 
adaptation to such changes, by both the USG mission staff and USAID implementing 
partners. 
USAID implementing partners have complained that the tools are in-depth and 
technical, and as a result, the first year of implementing them is always a challenge. 
However, USAID always provide ongoing technical support and training to its 
partners, so as to ensure their proper understanding and application (Interview with 
the USAID SA Programme Manager, September 2005). 
USAID manages its programmes through a customer-driven, results-oriented 
strategic planning and performance measurement approach. This means setting clear 
objectives and targets, collecting adequate information to measure progress, and 
adjusting strategies and tactics as required-all in consultation with partners and 
customers. USAID planning and management processes are based on the principles of 
participation, customer focus, empowerment, accountability and diversity. The 
organisation involves its partners in all its management processes (USAID, 2005cf). 
This is based on the recognition that the achievement of USAID results is largely 
dependent on the capacity of their implementing partners (Interview with the USAID 
Programme Manager, 2005). 
While USAID Mission Offices employ full-time programme specialists to manage 
their programmes, in cases where capacity is lacking, services are solicited from 
external organisations. The USAID's NGO Sector Strengthening Program is 
specifically designed to build the capacity of the NGO partners (USAID, 2005e). For 
example, Pact World19 has been contracted to provide technical capacity for all 
USAID partners in South Africa (USAID, 2005e). USAID also believes that technical 
19 
Pact World is a U.S. based capacity building organisation that works across the world, providing technical assistance to local 
NGOs. The organisation is contracted by USAID/SA to support their implementing partners on performance management and 
monitoring and evaluation. 
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support for its implementing partners is important to ensure sustainabihty of projects 
beyond the USAID funding. 
4.3.3 Partnership 
USAID is not an implementing organization itself, and so works through partners. 
The definition of a partner is quite broad and includes, all organisations and 
individuals that USAID collaborate with in order to achieve its results (USAID, 
2002). These include national governments and departments, international 
organizations, other donors, corporate and business organisations, national and local 
NGOs. Partnership occurs in terms of both funding and non-funding relationships. 
USAID uses the term partnership to explain that the organisation works with others to 
accomplish its goals. 
Partnership is seen in terms of common vision, values and commitment towards the 
achievement of shared goals. It offers an opportunity to share knowledge and 
resources, joint planning, achieving together, and learning from implementation. 
USAID sees partnership as a long lasting relationship that stretches beyond the 
boundaries of a funding relationship (Interview with the USAID SA Programme 
Manager, September 2005). 
In the interview, the Programme Manager for USAID SA stated that implementing 
partners are selected through a competitive process, based on the criteria set by the 
USAID head office, and administered by the local field missions. USAID SA selects 
partners that believe in its values, share a common vision, and contribute towards the 
achievement of their strategic objectives. Project implementing partners are selected 
through an annual request for proposals process, which is advertised publicly with 
clearly stated program objectives. Proposals are then reviewed by a team of experts, 
including the USAID staff and external experts from the government and NGO 
sectors. However, government departments and municipalities do not undergo a 
competition process, but grant funds are provided based on specific bilateral foreign 
aid agreement with the between the U.S. and S.A. governments. For example, the 
S.A. Department of Health receives HIV/AIDS funds from USAID not on a 
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CHAPTER 5: ANALYSIS 
5.1 POLICIES 
5.1.1 Sibambisene 
The findings from this study have shown that all the three organisations studied 
(Sibambisene, NMCF, and USAID SA) have come into existence based on certain 
values and the desire to pursue a certain policy agenda. However, it appears that the 
manner in which the three organisations articulate their identity and reasons for 
existence are not the same. Sibambisene emphasizes the needs of community, as well 
the organisations' legitimacy to address such needs. 
This is evident in the manner in which the interviewees proudly articulated the 
consultative process out of which the organisation was born, and rationale for its 
establishment. Exploring why the organisation does not have internal, codified 
policies, several reasons were cited; including that Sibambisene is new; and that there 
are more pressing needs from communities served, leading to staff spending more 
time on service delivery than internal organisational issues, including development of 
organisational policies. 
This can be argued in terms of policy action and managerialist frameworks discussed 
in the literature review section, especially Brinkerhoff and Cosby (2002:40), who 
argue that policy management21 is a technical, complex, and interactive process which 
demands the involvement and participation of key stakeholders. It demands 
consultation, consensus building, conflict resolution and compromise. It also demands 
strong vision and leadership, individuals or groups who strongly believe such a policy 
is necessary. 
Parsons (1995) argues that policy implementation is an interactive process between 
those who seek to implement the policy and those who control resources. The 
managerialist framework theorists argue that policy management demands a strong 
institutional capacity, including human resources, organisational culture and skills. 
21 Policy management in this context refers to processes and actions undertaken in designing, implementing, monitoring and 
evaluating a policy. 
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Based on the evidence from this study, and in relation to the policy implementation 
theories discussed above, conclusions can be drawn on three key issues. First, that 
there is a strong relationship between the organisation's period of existence and its 
capacity to manage policies. If policy management is an evolutionary, complex, and 
technical process; it can be argued that new organisations are less likely to have 
matured policies compared to organisations that have existed for a long time 
management. 
As Brinkerhoff and Cosby (2002) argue, policy demands the consultation and 
participation of multiple stakeholders, it may be concluded that Sibambisene has not 
yet built strong stakeholder networks that are conducive for policy making. Even 
though the findings revealed that the organisation was established based on a multi-
stakeholder consultative and participatory process, its focus was on the pressing 
community need for service delivery than policy making. It is therefore unsurprising 
that Sibambisene has not developed and codified policies at this stage. 
The second argument relates to institutional capacity. As the managerialist theorists 
argue, policy management is a technical process that demands strong institutional 
capacity, including vision, leadership, technical skills on policy issues, and financial 
resources. The findings revealed that Sibambisene still lacks this capacity. This is 
evident from their organisational structure, which largely consists of field workers 
who mainly deal with project related issues. These field workers were recruited based 
on the priorities of the organisation (service provision to communities), as well as the 
needs of donors to meet their performance objectives. 
Still related to institutional capacity is the culture of the organisation and vision of its 
leader. Sahley (1991) argues that local NGOs tend to focus more on the project 
outputs and overlook their internal organisational development and management 
issues. This stems, she argues, from the way NGOs perceive themselves as existing to 
serve communities, as well as pressures and demands to achieve donors programme 
objectives. They are often caught up in a cycle of addressing immediate pressures and 
priorities from donors and communities, and neglect the internal development of 
organisational capacities. NGOs are indeed overwhelmed with the short-term project 
contract demands for immediate results and donor reporting requirements. This also 
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became evident in the manner in which Sibambisene interviewees proudly and 
confidently articulated their main priority as serving communities of Umkhanyakude 
Municipal District. This is understandable given the purpose and history for the 
establishment of Sibambisene. Linked to this is the fact that communities provide 
legitimacy to local NGOs. Unlike donors, NGOs evolve within communities and 
interact with people on regular basis. 
Thirdly, Sibambisene's policy situation can be viewed in terms of the inter-
organisational analysis model, that policy making is mainly influenced by power and 
resource dependency. The argument here is that development is an interaction process 
between different actors, with some depending on others for resources. Those that 
have resources possess more power than those that do not. Theorists on power argue 
that parties who hold more power in the decision-making process will determine 
decisions that will prevail (Colebatch, 2002). 
It emerged from this study that donors, including NMCF, only fund project 
implementation related activities rather than organisational development. While there 
seems to be evidence that donors acknowledge the importance of capacity building 
and organisational development as a strategy for the sustainability of local NGOs 
(Eade, 1997), donors still prioritise project implementation when granting funds to 
local NGOs. 
5.1.2 Nelson Mandela Children's Fund 
The findings revealed that the NMCF has evolved from a grant-making to 
development organisation22 (Nelson Mandela Children's Fund, 2005&). This move 
reflects a shift in development policy thinking, from a welfarist to participatory 
development; clientilist to partnership; and interventionist to capacity building and 
sustainability. The transition of the NMCF from grant-making to development 
approach can be argued to be the result of learning from its programme 
22 
The NMCF makes a distinction between grant-making and development organisation. They argue that a grant-
making organisation only organise and distribute funds, without meaningful engagement with beneficiaries. 
Such organisation provide once-off immediate and unsustainable interventions. On the contrary, development 
organisations focus on the long-term sustainable and empowering interventions. They apply participatory 
approaches to development, uphold human rights principles and advocate for the poor and marginalized population 
sectors. 
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implementation process. When the organisation started to operate, grant-making was 
thought to be the best strategy for achieving set objectives, and policies were then 
designed according to that thinking. However, through implementation and 
programme review processes, the organisation has learnt that it needed an alternative 
approach to do its business, which has resulted in the strategic shift from grant-
making to a development approach. 
Based on these results, it may be argued that policy is an evolutionary process that 
changes over time based on the learning experience of those who implement it, and 
the will of policy makers to change the policy. Findings from this study contradicts 
both the views of the top-down theorists that policy is made from a higher 
administrative levels and cascades to the bottom; and the bottom-up approach that 
policies are made at grassroots levels to the higher administrative levels. Instead, it 
suggests that in practice policy making is a combination of the two approaches. 
In other words, policy making is a cyclical process that originates from decision 
makers to those responsible for implementing it, with a view to learn from 
implementation and adjust accordingly. In other words, implementation is a testing 
ground for policy making process. This implies that policy making is an ongoing 
process that changes with the changing needs of targeted beneficiaries. 
The NMCF also seems to have both the finances and capacity to develop and manage 
policies. This is evident from the research that it has commissioned, with a view to 
inform their policy and strategy development processes. The NMCF also puts 
emphasis on knowledge management, and identifies itself as a learning organisation. 
Analysis of the NMCF policy situation can be done using theories on power and 
policy frameworks. Based on the argument of the policy action theorists that policy 
making is an evolutionary process that requires strong technical and institutional 
capacity, it can be argued that the NMCF possesses this capacity. The Management 
Board offers a strong structure of governance. It consists of leaders from various 
professional backgrounds, including legal, government, finance, business, and 
political sectors. Such a structure of governance has sufficient capacity to lead the 
23 Studies commissioned include 2004 Strategic Reviews for Grants Administration by Kuljian; Programmes by 
Mamabolo; and Monitoring and Evaluation Report by Khulisa Management Consultants. 
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policy making process in the organisation. For example, the Management Board is 
divided into various committees, including finance and audit, human resources, 
development, investment and marketing. These committees are responsible for 
leading the organisation on relevant policy issues. In addition, the organisation has 
sufficient funds to hire technical experts to research or advise on certain policy and 
strategic issues. Therefore, this combination of skills creates a conducive environment 
for effective policy making and management within the organisation. 
5.1.3 United States Agency for International Development South Africa 
This study revealed that USAID SA has well developed policies and management 
systems, which cascade from the central office in Washington down to the mission 
offices at country level. The study also revealed that USAID was established to 
achieve the goals of U.S. government policies, particularly the National Security 
Strategy of 1993 and Foreign Assistance Act of 1978. It may therefore be argued that 
USAID is the U.S. government apparatus for its development agenda in order to 
mitigate the risks of instability, terrorism and humanitarian crisis across the world. 
There is also evidence that USAID policies change over time, as a result of changes in 
U.S Government priorities and influence from social, economic and political changes 
across the world. 
It may be argued that the USAID policy making process is both demand and supply 
driven. It is demand driven because it responds to the changing political, social and 
economic environments across the world. It is supply driven because it primarily 
serves the interests of the U.S government and American people. While the U.S. 
development agenda benefits people from recipient countries, it is primarily for the 
safety and prosperity of America. It may also be argued that the USAID development 
policies are influenced by international conventions, institutions and forums, such as 
United Nations (UN), World Health Organisation (WHO), International Labour 
Organisation (ILO) and World Trade Organisation (WTO). 
Based on the fact that USAID policies are demand driven, it can be argued that policy 
making is not entirely in the control of those who have resources. Even though 
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America might have financial power, circumstances such politics, economy, and 
social factors across the world dictate what forms of policies the U.S. government 
should pursue. While policy implementation theorists view policy making as mainly 
influenced by actors involved, we may add that at times the environment (rather than 
people) in which policy making takes place can largely influence people who make 
decisions about policies. 
The findings showed that USAID has a strong culture of planning, learning and 
performance improvement. One may conclude that USAID has both technical and 
financial capacity to make and manage policies. This is evident from the planning and 
management processes and tools that the organisation has developed and uses in 
managing its programmes, including 'managing for results' framework24, annual 
performance plans, annual reporting, monitoring and evaluation tools. 
A strong policy development culture within USAID is also evident in the manner in 
which the organisation is structured, with policy and research bureaus responsible 
research and policy development. There is also a strong evidence of vision, leadership 
and political will on policy issues, both within the organisation and the U.S. 
government. Performance management appears to be a priority for the U.S. 
government and USAID. This is evident from legislation such as the Results 
Framework Act of 1993. 
Thus, it appears that the approach of the three partnering organisations to policy 
implementation is a combination of a top-down and bottom-up approach. On the one 
hand, the USAID develops policies from the central office in Washington and filters 
them down to the mission offices for implementation. Nonetheless, there seems to be 
a deliberate mechanism (monitoring and evaluation) for project implementing 
partners to provide feedback and share learning experiences from the implementation 
process. This suggests that policy development and implementation is neither 
exclusively a top-down nor bottom-up process but rather a combination of the two 
approaches. Policy development is thus a continuous and evolving process that keeps 
Managing for results framework is a tool that is used by USAID and its partners to manage programme 
performance. It includes programme planning, monitoring and evaluation tools, as well as key success indicators. 
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on changing and improving over time, based on the changing needs and demands of 
beneficiaries and targets for which the policy has been made. 
5.2 PROCESSES 
The study has revealed that both donor agencies and recipients of donor funds follow 
certain processes in selecting partners, implementing and evaluating their 
programmes. However, donors dominate the control of these processes, initiating 
them and determining how they should unfold. The processes are developed internally 
by the donor based on what seems best for the organisation to manage its programme. 
They are then communicated to potential donor recipients as policies and procedures 
to follow in applying for funds. 
The study also showed that participation of partners in the processes of programme 
development is one of the principles for donor agencies. For example, USAID SA 
stated that relevant managers work with short-listed donor applicants to develop 
proposals that meet USAID requirements. The NMCF's new strategy has introduced a 
new process for developing partnerships with implementing partners. The aim is to 
ensure participation of community organisations from the initial planning stages of 
partnership, in order to have a proper understanding of processes to be followed. 
However, even though the process allows the participation of potential recipients, 
donors are still in the driving seat, determining and controlling when and how such 
processes should proceed. It can be argued that what donors call 'participation' is 
actually 'information sharing', since such sessions do not allow partners an 
opportunity to give their views or critique what the donor is presenting. In other 
words, partners participate in such meeting in order to get information rather than 
voice their views or challenge the position of the donor. This is understandable, as 
challenging or criticising a donor might jeopardise chances of getting funds. 
Brinkerhoff and Cosby (2000) argue that institutions possess certain power (based on 
their resources), and use such power to impose their ideas and decisions to others. 
This implies that when donor recipients share a platform with donors, power is 
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skewed towards the latter. In such a situation meaningful participation is almost 
impossible. 
Also, applicants are involved only in certain stages of the process, while other stages 
remain confidential. For example, applicants that are rejected are not given detailed 
feedback about the reason for this, other than a brief decline letter. It is the donor 
agency that compiles information, based on the applicant's proposal, for motivation to 
their decision-making bodies, such as the management board. The criteria used for 
donor agencies to approve or not approve funding remains their secret. The study also 
revealed that donor management processes demand more time from implementing 
partners, such as time to prepare reports, and this limits time spent serving 
communities. 
The study revealed that donor processes receive higher priority from donor recipient 
organisations than communities they serve. Even though Sibambisene stated that 
service provision to communities is their first priority, in reality donors get top 
priority. For example, field staff often postpone community activities when there are 
urgent matters or tasks required by donors, such as reports. This is understandable as 
non-compliance with the donor might discredit donor recipients, and sometimes result 
in sanctions. 
In terms of Luke's (1974) typologies of power it may be argued that donors win 
power by coercion and authority. Donor recipient organisations comply with the 
demands of donors because of fear of sanctions, such as withdrawal of project funds. 
It was discovered that both NMCF and USAID SA disburse funds to their recipients 
in tranches (instalments), which are paid out based on the compliance of the recipient 
with the conditions of the contract. Non-compliance can result in the withdrawal of 
outstanding tranches. 
This is similar to Galbraith's (1986) concept of condign power, in which compliance 
is won by imposing an unpleasant condition. Galbraith uses compensatory power to 
refer to the opposite of condign power. In this case, the holder of power wins 
compliance by attaching a reward or something of value to the other group to whom 
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power is exercised. Project funds can be viewed as a form of reward to the donor 
recipient organisation. 
Lukes (1974) argues that authority applies when the demands of one group over 
another are legitimised such that the enforcement of these demands are perceived to 
be reasonable, fair and just. It can then be argued that donors impose project contracts 
on the recipients attach a monetary value so that it becomes obligatory to recipients. 
This implies that the contract gives authority to the donor over the recipient, and thus 
inequality of power exists in that relationship. Therefore, recipients have no other 
choice in this kind of relationship, as non-compliance often results in a certain form of 
'punishment', such as deprivation of resources. 
5.3 MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS AND TOOLS 
Sahley (1991) states that NGOs require effective management systems and structures 
in order to function efficiently. These systems include decision-making, financial 
management, people management, project management, knowledge and information 
management. However, she argues, developing sound management systems and 
procedures is not usually an explicit priority for most NGOs. Most of their planning 
efforts focus is on programming and operational issues, and ignore their internal 
capacities. 
This study has revealed that there is a huge gap in terms of management capacities 
among USAID SA, NMCF and Sibambisene. While USAID SA and NMCF have 
well developed systems and tools for managing their work, these are lacking in 
Sibambisene. This was also confirmed by the study on the Capacity of Small 
Enterprise Development Agencies in Africa (Sahley, 1991). 
Poor management systems among small NGOs can be explained in terms of 
organisational culture, technical capacity, resource availability and influence of 
donors. The general organisational culture of programme implementing organisations 
focuses on programme planning and implementation, with little attention on their 
internal management systems. This might be largely based on their perception that 
their core function is to provide services to communities. If the general belief of the 
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organisational theorists that people bring their own cultures to the work place is true, 
in the South African context this perception of prioritising community needs above 
internal management matters might be rooted and perpetuated by the spirit of ubuntu 
(Human Kindness), which permeates our policies and practices (such as "Batho Pele" 
-People First). On the other hand, this perception might be embedded in the core 
principles of democracy, such as participation, accountability and consultation. 
Secondly, community organisations generally lack the technical capacity to address 
their internal management systems. Development and application of internal 
management systems requires technical skills that community service organisations 
often lack. Community service organisation tend to recruit staff that are more skilled 
in programme issues than administration and management. For example, out of six 
managers within Sibambisene five were programme staff. This shows that priority is 
given to programme management. 
The third reason for poor capacity in the area of systems management systems within 
this civil society organisation is the scarcity of resources. This organisation exists in a 
turbulent environment of fast changing technologies and competition for scarce 
resources. Development and maintenance of sound organisational management 
systems requires resources, which are not easily affordable to civil society 
organisations. These organisations largely depend on donor funding, and a large 
percentage of this amount is normally restricted to project implementation. 
5.3.1 Technical Assistance from donors 
This study has revealed that donors have capacity building plans as part of the grants' 
package for projects funded. Both the US AID SA and NMCF employ programme 
specialists and technical advisors, whose role is to continually provide advice and 
support in specific technical programmatical areas. In addition, the two organisations 
employ consultants to provide skills that are lacking internally. These consultants 
perform short-term technical tasks for implementing partners on behalf of donor 
agencies, including programme evaluations, development financial management and 
monitoring and evaluation systems. 
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Also, there seems to be a new trend from donor agencies to contract technical 
organisations to provide specific technical services to their partners during the term of 
the contract. These organisations include research and specific technical programme 
specialists. For example, USAID SA has contracted PACT to provide support on 
monitoring and evaluation; and research institutions such as South African Population 
Council to provide support to their partners. 
Based on the above examples it seems evident that there is some degree of 
commitment from donors to provide technical assistance and build the capacity of 
their implementing partners. Donors acknowledge that community service 
organisations have limited capacity to manage programmes and to account for granted 
funds. Capacity building has become an integral part of project funding. This might 
be fuelled by three factors: accountability, programme effectiveness, and project 
sustainability. Donors have to account to their management structures, and therefore 
have to develop systems of accountability at all levels of programme management. 
The hierarchical structure of USAID demands a strong system of accountability from 
the lowest to the highest level of the organisation. As a result, the organisation has 
developed technical management systems that are cascaded from the headquarters to 
the mission offices, and then to the implementing partners. 
Donors also want to ensure programme effectiveness among their partners, and 
therefore develop performance management systems and tools, such as monitoring 
and evaluation. This is necessary in order to report to the decision makers about the 
worthiness of the programmes supported, and the impact of funds being donated on 
the beneficiaries. Donors also seem concerned about the sustainability of projects 
beyond the funding contract. Capacity building therefore is designed so as to ensure 
that projects will continue beyond the funding relationship with donors. 
However, the question that arises is the extent to which these capacity building 
arrangements really strengthen the capacity of service organisations. The study 
revealed that technical assistance from donors is provided on an ad hoc and short-term 
basis. Training on organisational management systems is packaged as a "one size fits 
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a l l , and offered to implementing partners without considering their levels of 
literacy. Respondents confirmed that capacity building is done once off, and not 
followed up with coaching and mentoring until partner organisations can apply 
learned knowledge and skills. It was also found that at times donors relay inconsistent 
messages about their management systems, as a result of different technical advisors 
and consultants. At times there are no standard procedure manuals to refer to for 
consistency, and this often results in confusion rather than capacity building for the 
organisation. 
Sahley (1991:16) makes a distinction between organisational development and 
technical capacity building. She argues that the former starts from "within" and 
should be at an integral part of the organisation's vision and strategy. It is a long-term 
process that goes beyond the funding relationship with donors. On the contrary, 
technical assistance comes from the "outside" and is driven by donors. It is a short-
term capacity-building process to aimed at enabling implementing partners to achieve 
intended goals during the partnership period. 
Therefore, it appears that donors recognize the lack of capacity among NGOs, and 
implications for this on project quality, performance and sustainability. There also 
seems to be a strong commitment to enhance this capacity, as is evident from the 
donor's capacity building plans and budgets for their implementing counterparts. 
However, there is also evidence that these capacity building programmes are once off 
trainings, and not effective and sustainable. 
5.4 PARTNERSHIP 
This study has shown that the Sibambisene, the Nelson Mandela Children's Fund and 
USAID SA all describe their relationship with each other as a partnership. It also 
emerged that these organizations formed the partnership based on the recognition that 
there are certain benefits that each partner receives, and services they need to offer. 
But what are the benefits that each of these organisations receive, and what 
contributions do they make in the partnership? This partnership arrangement may be 
25 "One size fits all" training refers to training programme that is designed and offered to organisations 
without adaptation to their levels of capacity. 
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• a . 
explained using the organizational exchange theory on policy implementation, which 
views partnership as a mechanism for the exchange of benefits between two or more 
organisations. It may therefore be argued that donors contribute financial resources 
and technical skills into the partnership in exchange for service delivery. In other 
words, they buy services of donor recipients in order to fulfill their development goals 
in the operating countries. On the other hand, donor recipients contribute service 
delivery and time and receive financial resources and technical skills. Thus, there is 
something that each partner offers and receives. Also, in this partnership arrangement 
the autonomy of donor recipients is compromised, due to the unequal power 
relationship in favor of donors. 
Therefore, partnership between donors and recipients is characterized by a certain 
degree of inter-dependence, based on the recognition that by themselves they could 
not achieve their organizational goals. This implies that each organization brings 
something of value to the partnership. However, interdependence does not suggest 
equality of power between the two parties. Donors hold more power than recipient 
organisations. 
It may be argued that one of the reasons for the dominance of donors over recipients 
in this partnership arrangement is that donors own and control the process partnership. 
They initiate it, approve it, contract, monitor, and decide when to how long should it 
take it. This was evident in the manner in which the partnership between Sibambisene 
and the Nelson Mandela Children's Fund was formed. It was initiated by the latter 
through a competitive call for proposals. Sibambisene simply responded to a call from 
donor agencies, something that leads to compromise of their power throughout the 
process. 
Another observation from this study is that both donors and recipients enter into 
partnerships in order to achieve their individual interests and goals. While the 
partnership may be said to be intended for a common goal of improving the quality of 
life for poor people, the end result might be for selfish benefit. For example, this study 
has shown that the USAID's development agenda, while targeted at poor people from 
the host countries, is primarily intended for the benefit of American people. The 
USAID development agenda is an instrument for achieving the goals of the U.S. 
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USAID development agenda is an instrument for achieving the goals of the U.S. 
National Security Strategy of 1993, whose goal is to ensure safety of the American 
people through promoting peace, social and economic development of developing or 
fragile states. Thus, the ultimate outcome for the USAID's development programme 
is peace and freedom for the Americans. It may then be concluded that donor funding 
and partnership is not free to the developing states, but an investment for the 
prosperity of the donor countries. 
There is also evidence that USAID promotes and supports a "co-existence" approach 
to civil society organisations and the state relations. Quoted in the USAID (2006) the 
USAID Administrator Natsios states that political will, leadership and co-operation of 
development actors are key for the successful implementation of the USAID's 
development programme. This is also evident in the U.S. laws that promote 
cooperation of states on partnerships with the private sector, such as African Growth 
and Opportunity Act of 2000 and African Investment Incentive Act of 2006. The 
purpose of these legislations is to give trade investment incentives to African States 
who have scored high on the U.S. development objectives, as laid out in the USAID 
development agenda. 
Additional evidence of support for the "co-existence" approach by the USAID is in its 
Global Health Programme in South Africa. For example, USAID funds the National 
Comprehensive HIV/AIDS Strategy 2000-2010, which is a government programme. 
This then influences the selection criteria for NGO partners who apply for HIV/AIDS 
funds, as they are selected on the basis of whether their activities are in line with this 
plan. 
In other words, in principle it appears that NGOs that are likely to get funding from 
USAID are those that complement the state in delivering its services. The support of 
the "co-existence" approach by the USAID comes as no surprise, given their 
relationship with the U.S. Government. While it is stated that USAID is independent 
(USAID, 2006), in reality it appears to be an extension of the U.S. Government. 
One of the critical questions to be answered in this study is the rationale and 
motivation for USAID Programme in South Africa. Having discussed USAID's 
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involvement in U.S. foreign policy and the national security agenda across the world 
previously, it is important to specifically explain USAID involvement in South Africa 
in particular. According to the USAID SA Annual Report, "South Africa remains 
critical to US foreign policy interests and plays a key economic and political role in 
Africa bilaterally and regionally as an active member of regional bodies, such as the 
African Union and the New Partnership for Africa's Development. 
South Africa has been actively engaged in efforts to peacefully resolve conflicts in 
Angola, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mozambique, Rwanda, and Burundi 
and most recently in Zimbabwe. South Africa remains by far the most important U.S. 
trading partner in sub-Saharan Africa, excluding Nigeria, a major oil exporter" 
(USAID SA, 2004:2). 
The USAID Fragile State Strategy states that when development and governance fail 
in a country, the consequences engulf entire regions and leap around the world 
(USAID, 2005). Based on these two statements, one may conclude that the USAID 
S A programme is strategic, in order to achieve the goals of political, economic, and 
social stability. This statement seems to suggest that political, social and economic 
instability around the world poses a threat to the US government and American 
citizens in general. The logic is thus that underdevelopment may result in political and 
economic turmoil, which may spread to other parts of the world, and affect global 
economies, peace and governance. 
One may therefore conclude that the U.S. Government is concerned with both 
economic and socio-political risks of unstable states. The political concern is that 
underdevelopment may lead to violence, wars, terrorism, and corruption. The 
economic effects may be disruption of international trade protocols and agreements. It 
also appears that foreign assistance programme yields some investment benefits, since 
one of the USAID procurement conditions for donor funds recipients is the purchase 
American manufactured products. 
The inter-organizational analysis views decision makers as sourcing power from their 
organizations. This organizational power is derived from such things as structure, 
resources and technical knowledge. Therefore it may be argued that the hierarchical 
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dominance of the USAID in this partnership relationship. Power in the organizations 
is expressed through policies, procedures and processes. The study revealed that 
policies, procedures and management systems are developed from the central office 
and devolved to the regions and country mission office for implementation. This 
implies that decisions are taken from the top for implementation at the local levels. 
This further confirms the views of the top-down approaches to policy implementation, 
that policy flows from the top to the bottom. 
5.5 Rationale for funding Civil Society Organisations (CSO) 
Another critical question to answer is what are the motives for USAID to fund CSOs. 
Studies on the changing donor environment in South Africa suggests that the post 
1994 democratic era resulted in the shift of donor funding from the civil society 
organisations in favour of the government, in order to strengthen the new democracy 
(Kihato, 2001). If this is the case why then does, within the bilateral agreement 
framework, USAID still continues to fund CSOs instead of channelling all its funds to 
the government. One of the motivations might be the recognition of CSOs as key 
actors in the strengthening of democracy. 
USAID Private Voluntary Cooperation programmes such NGO Sector Strengthening, 
Global Partnerships and Capable Partners Programme26 give evidence to this fact. 
Supporting the State alone might not be enough in order to achieve the objective of 
democracy strengthening. In some cases the governments of hosting countries might 
have different policies or views on certain development issues from those of the U.S. 
government. In cases where hosting countries have policies certain development 
issues that are contrary to USAID, USAID might have alternatives of channelling 
such funds to organisations that best meet the interest of the U.S. government. 
Another motivation for direct funding to CSOs might be largely influenced by the 
national policies, strategies and perceptions of hosting governments on the role of 
CSOs. The neo-liberal nature of South Africa's economic and development policies 
NGO Sector strengthening aims to enhance NGO capacity to deliver services. Global partnership programme 
mobilises and co-ordinates funds from private sector organisations for development work in developing countries. 
Capable partners programme provides technical support to local NGOs. 
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CSOs. The neo-liberal nature of South Africa's economic and development policies 
has resulted in the development of multi-stakeholder strategies towards development, 
which calls for the active participation of the CSOs and private sector. These local 
policies then influence the manner in which donors distribute their development 
funds. For example, the South African National Comprehensive HIV/AIDS Plan, 
which is largely supported by the U.S. government, bears witness to this. USAID SA 
respondents stated that the implementation of the USAID Health Programme in South 
Africa is determined by the National Health Policies on HIV/AIDS. As a result, 
USAID supports the National Comprehensive HIV/AIDS Plan. Because this plan 
involves the active involvement of CSOs and business sector, USAID SA also 
supports CSOs that are actively involved in mitigating HIV/AIDS. 
Therefore, it appears that policies that demonstrate democratic principles, such as 
participation, accountability, good governance, corporate governance are attractive to 
the USAID foreign assistance programme. Based on this, conclusions can be drawn 
that the U.S. Government is in favour and encourages a corporatist and co-existence 
relationship between the state and CSOs. The co-operation between the state and civil 
society organisation has some implications for the U.S National Security Strategy. 
Firstly, it means is that there is generally no conflict between the two, stability of 
South Africa's democracy (less fragility) and thus less threat to the U.S. national 
security. Secondly, it means that there is a conducive environment for USAID to 
achieve its development goals of addressing poverty, under-development, and 
strengthening democracy. It means that the USAID is in a better position to address 
poverty and underdevelopment at a larger scale. 
Given the limited capacity of the state to address problems of underdevelopment, the 
will of civil society organisations to co-operate with and complement the state in this 
regard enables the provision of services to communities at a larger scale. In other 
words, the civil society becomes the service delivery arm of the state. This is very 
important in the South African development context, which is characterised by 
geographically widespread rural and semi-urban populations, unequal resource 
distribution, and poor social and economic services. 
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The stability of South Africa's democracy has implications for other parts of the 
African region. It means that South Africa can be trusted to resolve conflicts in other 
countries. The findings of this revealed that USAID's support to South Africa is also 
influenced by the role the country plays in addressing conflicts in neighbouring 
countries through peace negotiations and defence programmes, such as in Burundi 
and Democratic Republic of Congo. By so doing, this intervention contributes 
towards the achievement of some goals of the U.S. National Security Strategy: to 
reduce war, violence, political instability and underdevelopment; which if unchecked 
may affect economic development and peace across the world. 
It may therefore be concluded that the USAID's support to South Africa is two-fold, 
to address its internal development challenges, as well as to use support its diplomatic 
peace mission in the Southern African region. 
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5.6 CONCLUSION 
Development is a chain of human relationships linked by a common desire to improve 
lives of poor people. This chain links ordinary people, local NGOs, international 
NGOS and grant-makers. The links may become weak in the chain because some 
partners in the relationship possess more power. Power penetrates every aspect of 
human relationships, and it is sourced and used in different ways. 
The purpose of this study was to explore the impact of donor policies, processes and 
management tools on the work of civil society organisations, using Sibambisene, 
NMCF and US AID SA as a case study. Themes explored include each organisation's 
policies, processes used, management tools employed, the type of partnership practice 
in evidence and the power relations among them. 
Based on the analysis of findings from this research, and literature reviewed from the 
previous studies, it appears that both donor and implementing organisations recognise 
partnership as necessary for pursuing a common vision for development. It also seems 
that organisations, both donor and implementing partners, enter into partnership with 
different expectations and for different reasons. Donors need local NGOs to 
implement projects that will contribute to the achievement of their objectives and 
vision. On the other hand, implementing partners need donors for financial and 
technical support. 
It is also suggested that the partnership between donors and implementing NGOs is 
characterised by unequal power relations. This can be attributed to a number of 
factors, including financial control and technical capacity of donors, their control over 
policies, processes and management tools used. Policies are developed from the 
USAID central office in Washington and cascade down to regional and country 
mission offices for their actual implementation. Mission offices then communicate the 
implementation strategy as guidelines which need to be adhered to in order to qualify 
for donor approval and fund disbursement. 
Implementing partners consistently encounter difficulties in applying the donor 
management systems due to a lack of technical support from donors. Implementing 
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partners also spend increased time on administrative tasks in order to ensure 
compliance with donor requirements and deadlines. This then compromises the 
quality of their services and time spent with the communities to which they serve. The 
administrative burden attached to donor funding forces implementing partners to give 
increased priority to accounting to donor programmes rather than the communities 
they serve. 
By virtue of controlling funds, having technical capacity and managing the contract, 
donors possess authority over recipient organisations. It was revealed in this study 
that donors generally initiate and monitor project contracts. They develop terms of 
reference, undertake procurement processes, disburse funds, and decide whether the 
partnership relationship should continue or not. 
Sahley (1991) argues that the concept of partnership is largely rhetoric, overused and 
poorly defined. It obscures the reality that donors control funds and set priorities and 
conditions for donor funds disbursement, resulting in an unequal relationship. Overton 
and Storey, (2001) share a similar view in their argument that development agencies 
have adopted the rhetoric of building 'partnership' and 'relationship' in their 
programmes. 
They further argue at one level, this can be seen to reflect the call from the 
development theory that communities should be empowered by being given the 
opportunity to participate in their development initiatives, and thus have "ownership". 
In practice, however, this concern for relationship between donors and recipients 
seems to involve a strengthening of the latter in as far as improving efficiency and 
accountability in the use of donor funds. Overton and Storey, (2001:23) conclude by 
stating that relationships and partnerships are structured in a particular utilitarian way 
that reinforces the donor-recipient model and inequality. 
The findings from this study therefore suggest that the relationship between donors 
and implementing partners does not qualify to be called 'partnership', given that it is 
characterized by power inequality, dependency, and disempowerment of the recipient 
organisations. 
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Strategies that seek to address dependency of implementing partners are necessary 
partnerships should be adapted to fit needs of each partner. This should include joint 
planning and learning. Joint planning would also give opportunity to each partner to 
clarify its role, expectations and get an in-depth understanding of the partnering 
organisation. Effective implementation of partnership programmes starts with joint 
planning by the parties involved or intending to enter into partnership, and followed 
by continuous participation in all the processes of the partnership initiative. Joint 
planning and implementation would ensure that capacity gaps are identified, and that 
systems are adapted to the diverse levels and needs of each partner. 
While donors do undertake pre-award assessments for their projects, this is not 
effective as it does not encourage honesty and transparency on the side of assessed 
potential grantees. The reason being that potential donor recipients are more likely to 
impress donors by emphasising their strengths rather than weaknesses, in order to 
increase their chances of receiving funds. 
It is also important for donors to adapt their policies, systems and programmes to 
local conditions where they are intended to be implemented. Effective policy 
implementation is clouded with a number of internal and external environmental 
factors, that implementers should keep checking in order to minimize risks for 
implementation. Local and implementing partners should ensure that they have 
defined their identity, both in terms of values and core business, before they enter into 
a partnership relationship. This would ensure that they do not lose focus. 
Local NGOs should also ensure that they develop new fundraising strategies, that are 
more internally and locally focussed. Suggested ways of reducing donor financial 
dependence include locally based fundraising, membership subscription fees, and 
income generating activities. Best-practice cases in this regard in South Africa include 
the Victory Sonqoba Community Stokvel, Men on the Side of the Road project, and 
Cape Mental Health Society (Global Policy Forum, 2005). 
In summary, this study has examined power relations between donors and donor 
recipients, within the context of decision-making processes, policy implementation, 
partnership, and application of management systems and tools. The study revealed 
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that the partnership between donors and civil society organisations displays unequal 
power relations, with the latter dominating policy decision-making processes. This is 
largely attributed to the financial dependence of civil society organisations on the 
donor funds. The result is that civil society organisations compromise their autonomy 
in their interaction with donors. Therefore, there is a need for financial independence 
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1. Briefly explain the purpose, values and goals of your organisation. 
2. Explain your key organisational policies as well as national and 
international policies that provide a framework for your activities. 
3. How does your organisation view partnership? 
4. Are there particular criteria which guide your organisation in selecting 
and engaging with implementing partners? 
5. If so, describe them. 
6. Explain the process your organisation follows in selecting partners. 
7. What happens when organisations do not meet your organisation's 
selection criteria? 
8. In terms of this study I understand management tools as processes and 
systems used to manage the planning, implementation, monitoring and 
evaluating programmes and projects. What tools does your organisation 
use to manage its projects. 
9. How does your organisation communicate such tools to partner 
organisations. 
10. Do you think your implementing partner organisations fully understand 
these tools and systems? 
11. If not, why? 
12. How do you address conflict that may arise between your organisation 
and its partners? 
13. How does your organisation ensure sustainability for its projects or 
interventions? 
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